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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ANABASIS, INC.,

)
Case No. 20000832-CA

Petitioner Appellant, )
vs.

)

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION,
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
APPEALS BOARD,

)
)
Priority No. 14

Respondent Appellee. )

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW OF DECISION OF UTAH LABOR
COMMISSION BOARD OF APPEALS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this
matter pursuant to Section
Annotated.

34A-l-303(6), Utah

Code

"[T]he court of appeals has jurisdiction

to: (a) review, reverse, remand, or annul any order
of the . . . [Utah Labor Commission] Appeals Board."
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether the Utah Labor Commission correctly
interpreted and applied the law in concluding it could
impose a penalty for past noncompliance under § 34A-2211(2), Utah Workers' Compensation Act, after Anabasis
obtained workers' compensation insurance. The relevant
part of § 34A-2-211(2) provides for "a penalty . . .
if . . .

an employer

. . .
1

is conducting business

without securing" workers' compensation insurance.
Citation to record showing
administrative
Noncompliance
February

agency.
And

16, 1999

issue preserved

Answer

Intent

To

To

Assess

Notice

Penalty

(Addendum 4a, R. 20).

in
Of

dated

Anabasis'

Appeal And Request For Hearing On Determination And
Order Declaring Noncompliance And Assessing A Penalty
dated March 28, 1999, ff2, 14, 18 & 19 (Addendum 10,
13, R. 3, 4 ) .

Reply Brief Of Anabasis, dated August

13, 1999, page 5 (Addendum

29, R.

43).

Anabasis'

Motion For Review dated May 5, 2000 (Addendum 37-39,
R. 56-58).
Standard of review.

The correction of error

standard of review applies, giving no deference to the
administrative agency's decision.

Cathco v. Valentine

Crane Brunjes Onyon Architect, 944 P.2d 365, 367 (Utah
1977).
but

no

This case involves an agency-specific statute,
administrative

agency

making power is required
"In

matters

of

pure

expertise

to interpret

statutory

or

policy-

the statute.

interpretation,

appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling
correctness
conclusions."

and

gives

no

deference

to

its

an
for

legal

Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc.,

935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997)(citing State v. Vigil,
842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992)). "[0]ur primary goal is
2

to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of
the purpose of the statute was meant to achieve. . • .
We

therefore

language."
1998).

look

first

to

the

statute's

plain

Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah

The Utah Administrative Procedures Act § 63-

46b-16(4)(d) provides in part:
The appellate court shall grant relief only
iff on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following: . . . (d) the agency has
erroneously interpreted or applied the law.
Nucor Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294, 1296
(Utah 1992); Morton Int'lf Inc. v. State Tax Comm'nf
814 P.2d 581, 589

(Utah 1991); Sierra Club v. Utah

Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd., 964 P.2d 355, 344
(Utah Ct. App. 1998); O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement
Bd., 929 P.2d

1112, 1114-15

(Utah Ct. App.

affld, 956 P.2d 279 (Utah 1998).
case are not disputed.

1996),

The facts of the

The only issue is whether the

labor commission properly interpreted and applied an
agency-specific statute, § 34A-2-211(2), Utah Workers'
Compensation Act, where the labor commission has not
been granted specific discretion to interpret or apply
the

statutory

language.

"This

is

a

question

of

statutory construction" reviewed under a "correction
of error" standard.
Industrial Comm'nf

Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v.
947

P.2d

671, 675

(Utah

1997).

"[Q]uestions of statutory construction are matters of
3

law for the courts, and we . . . accord no deference
to an administrative agency's interpretation."

Chris

and Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d
511, 513 (Utah 1990).

"We review an agency's . . .

application of statutes for correctness, unless the
statute

in question grants

Commercial Carriers v.

the

agency

Industrial

discretion."

Comrn'n, 888

P.2d

707, 710 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
2. Whether

the

labor

commission

abused

its

discretion delegated to it by § 34A-2-211(2)(a) by not
even

exercising

noncompliance
Anabasis

discretion,

penalty

unknowingly

and

under

the

having

a

by

imposing

circumstances
gap

in

a
of

business

insurance coverage and obtaining workers' compensation
insurance soon after notice from the labor commission.
Citation to record showing
administrative agency.
For

Hearing

On

issue preserved

in

Anabasis' Appeal And Request

Determination

And

Order

Declaring

Noncompliance And Assessing A Penalty dated March 28,
1999f ff2, 6, 14 & 17 (Addendum 10, 11 12 & 13, R. 1,
2, 3 & 4 ) . Reply Brief Of Anabasis, dated August 13,
1999, page 2, 6 & 7 (Addendum 29, 30 & 31, R. 40, 44 &
45).

Anabasis' Motion For Review dated May 5, 2000

(Addendum 37-39, R. 56-58).
Standard of review. The Utah Administrative
Procedures

Act

§

63-46b-16(4)(i)&(iv)
4

governs

the

applicable

standard

adjudicative

of

review

for

hearing. Obviously, more

a

formal

discretionary

leeway should be given to administrative action when
special agency expertise or rule-making power exists
than when it does not.

Case language does not appear

to carefully articulate much difference between the
standards of review where special agency expertise or
rule-making

power

exists

and

when

it

does

not.

Anabasis claims no special agency expertise or policymaking power should apply here, so the standard

of

review should be reasonableness and rationality with
no deference given to the labor commission's decision.
It has been said that reasonableness and rationality
is

the

same

as

§

63-46b-16(4)(i)

"abuse

of

the

discretion" or § 63-46b-16(4)(iv) "otherwise arbitrary
or capricious."

Caporoz v. Labor Comm'n, 945 P.2d

141, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
has

granted

issue,

an

we

agency

review

reasonableness."

"When the Legislature

discretion
the

to

determine

agency's

action

an
for

Caporoz at 143; see Cross v. Board

of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).

In Bernard v. Motor Vehicle Div.F 905

P.2d 317, 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) the reasonableness
and

rationality

administrative

standard
agency

was
did

5

applied
not

where

have

the

special

discretionary

expertise or rule-making

distinction between the two

types

of

power.

The

discretionary

power is found in the amount of deference given the
agency

decisions,

not

in

the

"reasonableness

and

rationality" language used to describe the different
standards of review.
3. Whether Anabasis is entitled

to reasonable

attorney fees pursuant to the Small Business Equal
Access to Justice Act § 78-27a-5.
Standard of review.

This issue is not here

on review. Litigation expense awards are authorized in
appeals from administrative decisions by § 78-27a-5.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable statutes and rules are set out by
citation alone in the Table of Contentsf pages iv-v,
and verbatim in the Addendum, pages 46-59.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the case.
The labor commission determined Anabasis failed
to provide workers• compensation

insurance

for

its

employees from November 2, 1988, to January 12, 1999,
and ordered Anabasis to pay a $1,000 penalty to the
Uninsured Employers' Fund.
the entire

Order

Denying

Anabasis seeks review of
Motion

For Review, dated

August 30, 2000, made by the Appeals Board, Utah Labor
Commission, affirming the Administrative Law Judge's
6

Order dated April
Division's Order
$1,000.00

14, 2000, affirming the Accident
dated

penalty,

1981085827.

Utah

(Addendum

March

3f

Labor

1999, assessing

Commission

40-45, R.

Case

68-73.)

a

No.

Anabasis

filed its Petition For Writ Of Review in this Court on
September 28, 2000.
B. Course of proceedings and dispositions by the
labor commission.
The first Notice of Noncompliance In Providing
Workers' Compensation Insurance Coverage was made on
January 6, 1999.

(Addendum 1, R. 21.)

The Notice Of Noncompliance And Intent To Assess
Penalty, with a penalty computation attached thereto,
was made on February 12, 1999. (Addendum 2-4, R. 14-15.)
Determination And Order Declaring Noncompliance
And Assessing A Penalty of $1,000 was made on March 3,
1999.

(Addendum 7-9, R. 16-18.)
By labor commission letter dated March 3, 1999,

Anabasis was informed, among other things: "Based on
the

above

information

and

the

fact

there

was

no

insurance in effect during the period penalized for by
the

commission

the

penalty

(Addendum 5-6, R. 22-23.)

will

not

be

waived."

There is another

dated March 30, 1999, to the same effect.

letter

(Addendum

15-16, R. 24-25.)
On April 14, 2000, Findings Of Fact, Conclusions
7

Of

Law And

Order were

Administrative

Law

made

Judge,

by

Donald

Utah

Labor

L.

George,

Commission,

Adjudication Division, affirming the Determination And
Order Declaring Noncompliance And Assessing A Penalty
of $1,000 made March 3, 1999.
55.)

(Addendum 32-36, R. 51-

The matter was submitted to the Administrative

Law Jude for decision on briefs and the record without
sworn testimony.
On August 30, 2000, the Order Denying Motion For
Review

was

Commission.

made

by

Appeals

Board,

Utah

Labor

(Addendum 40-45, R. 68-73.)

C. Disposition at trial agency.
The Appeals Board, Utah Labor Commission, made
its Order Denying Motion For Review dated August 30,
2000

(Addendum

40-45,

R.

68-73),

affirming

the

Administrative Law Judge's Order dated April 14, 2000
(Addendum

32-36, R.

51-55),

affirming

the

Accident

Division's Order dated March 3, 1999 (Addendum 7-9, R.
16-18), assessing a $1,000.00 penalty.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Findings Of Fact set out

in

The

Appeals

Board, Utah Labor Commission, Order Denying Motion For
Review dated August 30, 2000 (Addendum 40-45, R. 6873),

are

not

substantially

disputed,

as

follows:

Anabasis has been in business for several years and
has had employees during that time.
8

Anabasis obtained

a policy of workers' compensation insurance effective
February 1, 1999.

On February

12, 1999, the labor

commission imposed a $lf000 penalty against Anabasis
for failure

to maintain

coverage

from November

2,

1998, to January 12, 1999.
The
recordf

following
but

Anabasis

undisputed

not

set

out

in

thought

it

had

all

facts
the

insurance

coverage

and

in

the

above

findings.

necessary

business

insurance. Anabasis did not know it
business

are

had

obtained

a

gap

in

workers'

compensation insurance soon after receiving notice of
noncompliance from the labor commission.

(Addendum

11, f6, R. 1-5.)
ARGUMENT
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The labor commission is not authorized to impose
a penalty for past noncompliance when the employer has
workers' compensation insurance under § 34A-2-211(2),
which provides, in relevant part:
impose a penalty . . .

"[T]he division may

if the division believes that

an employer of one or more employees is. conducting
business

without

securing''

insurance. (Emphasis added.)
in

Point

I,

Anabasis

workers'

compensation

In analyzing the statute

looks

first

to

the

labor

commission's interpretation; then its plain language;
its intended

purposes; special
9

agency

expertise

or

policy-making power; and finally, reasonableness and
rationality.

Point

II

discusses

administrative agency discretion.
attorney fees pursuant

the

exercise

of

Point III discusses

to the Small Business Equal

Access to Justice Act, § 78-27a-l, et seg.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 34A-2-211 OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION
ACT
IS
NOT
AMBIGUOUS,
AND
NEEDS
NO
INTERPRETATION
The standard of review is set forth above at
Statement Of Issues, Standards Of Review.
A. The labor commission's interpretation.
Marshalling grounds for statutory interpretation
of

§

34A-2-211,

Workers'

Compensation

Act,

most

favorably to the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board's
conclusions, it is noted:
as a whole."

"The statute should be read

Cathco v. Valentine Crane Brunjes Onyon

Architect, 944 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah 1977) and Andrus v.
Allred, 404 P.2d 972 (Utah 1965),

17 Utah 2.d 106,

109, are cited by the Appeals Board in its Discussion
And Conclusions Of Law, at pages 3 & 4.
43, R. 70-71).

Some references to

(Addendum 42-

"the period of

noncompliance" are made in subsections of 34A-2-211.
The Appeals Broad concluded:
The language of §34A-2-211(2), when read as a
whole and in light of its intended purpose,
indicates its operation is not confined only
to continuing violations, but also applies to
10

instances of past violations.
(Appeals Board Discussion And Conclusions Of Law, page
4, Addendum 43, R. 71.)
B. Section

34A-2-211

should

be

interpreted

according to its plain language.
"In interpreting a statute, the court must look
first to its plain language.'' Valcarce v. Fitzgeraldf
961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998).

Section 34A-2-211 of

the workers' compensation act is not ambiguous, and
needs no interpretation.
Here, as in other cases, ' [w]hen faced with a
question of statutory construction, we look
first to the plain language of the statute.'
Under our rules of statutory construction, we
need not look beyond the plain language of
this provision unless we find some ambiguity
in it. (Citations omitted.)
V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 942 P.2d 906, 916
(Utah

1996).

Anabasis

submits

"is

conducting

a

business" is not ambiguous when reading the statute in
whole

or

in

part.

The

labor

commission's

interpretation is not correct if the plain language
analysis is applied to statutory construction.
C. Interpreting

the

statute

according

to

its

intended purposes.
Notwithstanding

its plain language, the Labor

Commission Appeals Board concluded

the

statute was

ambiguous and needed interpretation by looking at its
intended

purpose.

A

discussion

of

the

role

of

legislative purpose in statutory construction follows.
11

1. Plain

language

is

the

best

evidence

of

legislative intent.
In Andrus v. Allred, 404 P.2d

972, 974

(Utah

1965) the Supreme Court said:
[0]ne of the fundamental rules of statutory
construction is that the statute should be
looked at as a whole and in the light of the
general purpose it was intended to serve; and
should be so interpreted and applied as to
accomplish that objective.
Andrus involved unique facts under the Guest Statute
later declared unconstitutional.
observed

that

statutory

hair

The Supreme Court

splitting

was

not

an

appropriate way to apply the law, and pointed out the
usefulness of looking at the purpose of a statute in
interpreting it.
Arguments were made before the labor commission
whether the purpose of § 34A-2-211(2) is compliance,
punishment, revenue generation, or a combination of
purposes.

The Workers' Compensation Act contains no

purpose clause.

The Act needs no general

clause because its proverbial purpose
workers'

compensation

insurance

for

purpose

is to secure
workers.

The

issue on appeal is the specific intent and purpose of
§ 34A-2-211(2) in carrying out the general purpose of
the Act. This specific subsection requires compliance,
imposes a penalty for noncompliance, and deposits the
penalty in the Uninsured Employers1 Fund.
12

Therefore,

Anabasis concludes there are three factors to consider
in

interpreting

subsection;

the

which

intent

are

and

purpose

compliance,

of

the

punishment,

and

revenue generation. These are not conflicting factorsf
nor does one factor carry more weight than another.
All factors should be applied in maximum harmony with
the

whole

Act

expressing

the

and

the

plain

factors.

statutory

The

labor

language
commission

emphasizes two factors at the expense of one factor,
thereby

doing

harmonious

violence

to

application

whole Act.

of

the
the

By emphasizing

plain

language

subsection

some

and

with

factors more

the
than

another factor the labor commission is carrying out
its

policy

rather

than

the

legislature's

policy.

There is no express or implied statutory indication
that

one

factor

should

be given more weight

than

another. The labor commission's limited interpretation
gives

the

subsection

less

scope

than

inhibiting compliance with penalties.

intended

by

There is no

compelling reason to ignore the pain language of the
statute.

A penalty for existing noncompliance is a

salutary incentive to comply.
like

statute

noncompliance.

requiring
Revenue

This is not a criminala

penalty

generation

for

should

past
not

be

considered its main purpose merely because the penalty
"shall be deposited in the Uninsured Employers' Fund."
13

Section 34A-2-211(3).

Requiring employers to provide

workers' compensation insurance is as important as
funding the Uninsured Employers' Fund with penalties.
The purpose of § 34A-2-211(2) is to obtain and
maintain compliance before
claim is made.
effect

when

a

The best insurance is a policy in
claim

is

noncompliance does not
compliance.
the

premium

a workers' compensation

made.

Penalizing

necessarily

past

enhance present

A penalty does not help an employer pay
for

workers'

compensation

insurance.

Penalizing present noncompliance enhances compliance,
and carries out the compliance purpose of the statute.
A "statute should be construed in harmony with
the legislative intent and . . . its plain language is
the best evidence of legislative intent."

Cathco v.

Valentine Crane Brunjes Onyon Architect, 944 P.2d 365,
369 (Utah 1977).

If the plain language of the stature

carries out its intended purpose, then the statute
should

be

applied

construction

to

outside

plain

its

as

expand

written,

without

statutory

and

enlarge

its

meaning.

Purpose

is

statutory interpretation.

coverage
used

for

Interpretation need not be

used to determine purpose. The labor commission tries
to

expand

and

enlarge

the

statutory

purpose

by

interpreting an unambiguous statute; and then use the

14

expanded

and

enlarged

purpose

to

interpret

statuter contrary to its plain wording.

the

Such a daisy

chain exercise is condemned by Andrus.
It

appears

from

the

record

that

the

labor

commission argued what the statute should mean, rather
than what its words do mean.

The labor commission

seems to argue that its interpretation makes better
law

than

Anabasis'

interpretation.

Like

well-

instructed juries, we should not be concerned with the
wisdom of any law, but we should be concerned with our
own wisdom in applying the law.

Discussing the merits

of a statute is not productive because statutes vary
from

good,

bad,

to

indifferent,

individual points of view.

depending

on

Discussing the merits of a

law leaves no time to apply it.
2. The labor commission's interpretation carries
out an unauthorized administrative agency policy to
punish and generate revenue.
The record shows the labor commission
the penalty

to carry

policy

punishing

of

out

imposed

an administrative

employers

subject

agency
to

its

regulatory powerf and a policy to raise revenue for
its Uninsured Employers' Fund with penalties.
labor

commission

generating

emphasized

purposes

of

§
15

punitive
34A-2-211.

and
The

The

revenue
labor

commission claimed, "The very nature of a penalty is
to

punish."

Alsof

"it

is

clear

the

legislature

intended the penalty to accommodate and compensate the
fund

[Uninsured

Employers'

Fund,

§

34A-2-704]

for

paying out compensation for uninsured employers

for

those period of noncompliance, regardless of whether
or not an employer is currently insured."
Industrial Accidents
dated

July

Division

26, 1999, page

(Addendum 20, R. 34.)

&

Closing

4, citing

(Brief Of
Arguments,

§ 34A-2-417.

Penalties are deposited to the

Uninsured Employers' Fund pursuant to § 34A-2-210(3).
Anabasis claims the plain language shows the purpose
of § 34A-2-211(2) is remedial and compliance oriented.
The statute is hard on employers who do not remedy
violations,

and

lenient

for

those

who

do

consequences

and

risks

for

past

remedy

violations.
Other

non-

compliance, not at issue in this case, can be severe
and are dealt with elsewhere in the Act.
noncomplying employers do not get off
waiting

until a

§

34A-2-211

penalty

Therefore,

scot-free by
is

threatened

before complying.
3. The labor commission's interpretation gives
different meanings to the same words in consecutive
sections.
Anabasis

can

find

nothing
16

in

the

whole

Act

suggesting
The

"is conducting"

Appeals

Board

cites

means

"was

nothing

to

conducting."
support

its

conclusion that its interpretation of the statute is
supported

by

the

"light of

Order Denying Motion
2000f page 4.

its

intended

For Review, dated

purpose."

August 30,

(Addendum 43, R. 71.)

All references to "is conducting business," "is
conducting a business," "the period of noncompliance"
and

"purpose"

in

§§

34A-2-210

and

34A-2-211

are

highlighted below; and lend no support to the labor
commission's interpretation.
34A-2-210.
Power
to
noncompliance.
* * * * *

bring

suit

for

*

(2) If the division has reason to believe that
an employer is conducting a business without
securing the payment of compensation in one of
the three ways provided in Section 34A-2-201,
the division may give the employer five days
written notice by registered mail of the
noncompliance and if the employer within the
five days written notice does not remedy the
default:
(a) the commission or the division on
behalf of the commission may file suit under
Subsection (1); and
(b) the court may, ex parte, issue without
bond a temporary injunction restraining the
further operation of the employer's business
until the payment of these benefits has been
secured by the employer as required by Section
34A-2-201.
34A-2-211. Notice of noncompliance to employer - Enforcement power of division — Penalty.
(1) (a) In addition to the remedies specified
in Section 34A-2-210, if the division has
reason to believe that an employer
is
conducting
business without
securing the
payment of benefits in one of the three ways
provided in Section 34A-2-201, the division
17

may give that employer written notice of the
noncompliance by certified mail to the lastknown address of the employer.
*

*

*

*

*

(2) (a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the
division may impose a penalty against the
employer under this Subsection (2):
*

*

*

*

*

(ii) if the division believes that an
employer
of
one
or more
employees
is
conducting
business without
securing
the
payment of benefits in one of the three ways
provided in Section 34A-2-201.
(b) The penalty imposed under Subsection
(2)(a) shall be the greater of:
(i) $1,000; or
(ii) three times the amount of the
premium the employer would have paid for
workers' compensation insurance based on the
rate filing of the Workers' Compensation Fund
of Utah during the period of noncompliance.
(c) For purposes of Subsection (2)(b)(ii),
the premium is calculated by applying rates
and rate multipliers to the payroll basis
under Subsection (2)(d), using the highest
rated employee class code applicable to the
employer's operations.
(d) The payroll basis for the purpose of
calculating the premium penalty shall be 150%
of the state's average weekly wage multiplied
by the highest number of workers employed by
the employer during
the period
of the
employer's noncompliance multiplied by the
number
of
weeks
of
the
employer's
noncompliance up to a maximum of 156 weeks.
(3) The penalty imposed under Subsection (2)
shall be deposited in the Uninsured Employers'
Fund created by Section 34A-2-704 and used for
the purposes of that fund.
(Highlights added.)
Anabasis submits the meaning of "is conducting a
business" and "is conducting business" is the same in
§§ 34A-2-210 and 34A-2-211, but different if the labor
commission's interpretation is used.

Section 34A-2-

210(2)(a)(b) allows the labor commission to file suit
18

and obtain

"a temporary

injunction

restraining

the

further operation of the employer's business until the
payment of these benefits has been

secured

by the

employer as required by Section 34A-2-201," only if "the
division has reason to believe that an employer is
conducting a business without" workersf

compensation

insurance. (All emphasis added.) There is no reason to
obtain an injunction against noncompliance after there
is compliance, regardless

of

"past

noncompliance."

Therefore, the § 34A-2-210 meaning of "is conducting a
business"

necessarily

ambiguity or
statute

as

business"

need
a

in

means

of

it

says,

interpretation.

whole
§

what

indicates

34A-2-210

"is

means

Reading
conducting

the

conducting business" in § 34A-2-211.

without

same

as

the
a
"is

That is to say,

the labor commission may seek an injunction or impose
a

penalty

conducting

for

noncompliance

business

without

if

the

workers'

employer

is

compensation

insurance at the time the injunction is sought or the
penalty

is

imposed.

The

labor

commission's

interpretation gives different meanings to the same
words in consecutive sections.

The relationship of

consecutive sections should be examined in interpreting
a statute.

A "statute should be construed as a whole,

with all of its provisions construed to be harmonious
19

with each other."

Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898

P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995).
4. The labor commission has no special agency
expertise or agency policy-making power to interpret
the language in question.
There

is

no

reason

to

interpret

statutory

language which is not ambiguous in whole or in part.
Although § 34A-2-211 is an agency-specific statute, no
special agency expertise or agency policy-making power
is required to interpret the language in question.
Knowing

if

and

when

an

employer

has

workers'

compensation insurance does not require expertise or
the exercise of policy.
the

labor

commission

Nor does knowing if and when
may

impose

a

noncompliance

penalty require expertise or the exercise of policy.
The

labor

commission

may

impose

a

noncompliance

penalty if and when the employer is not in compliance
with the Act.

What constitutes compliance in unusual

situations may require some agency expertise or the
exercise of administrative policy, but determining the
date when compliance is obtained to the satisfaction
of the labor commission does not.

An employer simply

complies or not on a specific date to the satisfaction
of

labor

commission

administrative

standards.

No

penalty for past noncompliance may be imposed after
compliance.

If

"is

conducting
20

business

without

securing" workers' compensation insurance means what
it saysf Anabasis cannot be fined for noncompliance
because it had insurance when fined.
5. The
not

meet

labor
the

commission's
deferential

interpretation

does

reasonableness

and

rationality standard applicable when an administration
agency does have discretionary or policy-making power.
Section 32A-2-211 read alone and with the whole
Act is not ambiguous.

The only permissible reading of

the

the

§

32A-2-211

is

labor

commission

has

no

authority, express or implied, to interpret when to
impose a penalty.

No matter how much discretionary

power or policy-making power the labor commission may
have under the Actf its interpretation of § 32A-2-211
does

not

meet

rationality

the

standard

deferential
of

the

standard

of review because

violence

to

statute.

the

plain

Deference

to

reasonableness

cases

its

language

cited

in

interpretation
and

intent

administrative

of

and
the
does
the

discretion

applies only when an administrative agency has special
discretionary expertise or rule-making power. Bernard
v. Motor Vehicle Div.f 905 P.2d 317, 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
POINT II
THE
LABOR
COMMISSION
DID
NOT
EXERCISE
ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCRETION AS REQUIRED BY
SECTION 34A-2-211 OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION
ACT
The standard of review is set forth above at
21

Statement Of Issues, Standards Of Review.
Support

for

the

labor

commission's

claim

exercised discretion is marshalled as follows.

it
The

Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board found "the basis
for

the

Anabasis

Division's
has been

imposition

of

set forth in

Division and the ALJ

penalty

the

[administrative

well as in this decision."

orders

of

the

law judge], as

Order Denying Motion For

Review, dated August 30, 2000, page 4.
R. 71.)

against

(Addendum 43,

Apparently the Utah Labor Commission Appeals

Board is referring to its finding of fact, at page 2,
that "The salon has been in business for several years
and

has

had

employees

during

that

time."

The

administrative law judge mentioned the fact that "It
is undisputed that Anabasis had employees during the
period

in

January

question

12,

from

1999,

but

November
did

2f

not

1998
have

through
workers

compensation insurance in force during that period."
Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order, page
1.

(Addendum 32f R. 51.)

And at page 4, "Anabasis

has not provided any case law that would allow the
Division, the Administrative Law Judge, or the labor
commission to impose, reduce, or suspend that $1,000
penalty.

Accordingly, the penalty is affirmed."

Utah Labor

Commission

Appeals

board

implied,

The
in a

footnote, that the penalty could have been higher if a
22

longer penalty period had been used.

Order Denying

Motion For Review, page 2, footnote 2.

(Addendum 41,

f. 2, R.

69.)

The penalty period

applied

is not

disputed, nor is it claimed a shorter penalty period
was used as an exercise of discretion.
period

is not an issue on appeal.

The penalty
(Incidentally,

footnote 1 on the same page refers to two to six
employees.

Anabasis had only one or two employees at

a time, but this is not an issue on appeal either.)
While it is true Anabasis did not provide "any
case law that would allow . . . the Labor Commission
to . . . suspend that $1,000 penalty," Anabasis did
cite § 34A-2-211(2)(a)(ii), for which counsel finds no
applicable

case

law

on

the

commission

made

no

specific

subject.
finding

The
as

labor

to

the

sufficiency of Anabasis' claim that it thought it had,
and had good reason to believe it had, full business
insurance

coverage,

and

did

not

know

it

had

an

insurance gap until notified by the labor commission.
This claim was made in Anabasis' Appeal And Request
For

Hearing

On

Determination

And

Order

Declaring

Noncompliance And Assessing A Penalty dated March 28,
1999,

ff6

&

17

(Addendum

11, 13, R.

2,

4 ) , and

Anabasis' Motion For Review dated May 5, 2000,
pages 2 & 3 (Addendum

38-39, R. 57-58).
23

at

Business

cannot be conducted without reliance on many agents,
including

insurance

agents.

It

is

reasonable

to

expect an insurance agent to comply with a request to
provide

full

business

insurance

coverage,

which

includes workers' compensation insurance, or at least
inform the business it needs such insurance.
point

was

made

in

the

above

mentioned

This

pleadings.

Whether this is a sufficient excuse in the exercise of
sound administrative discretion is a decision for the
labor commission to make in the first instance.

The

administrative agency should explain its discretionary
decisions

in

its

findings.

should have made a

finding

The

labor

commission

specifically

addressing

this claim, explaining why the Anabasis' excuse was,
or

was

factors.
penalty

not,

sufficient

in

weighing

discretionary

The legislature did not intend to impose a
in

all

exceptions.

cases,

While

regardless

Anabasis

of

should

meritorious
not

expect

elaborate, detailed, and total technical correctness
in

findings,

a

reasonable

ignored in findings
While
the
discretionary
Division, the
the foregoing
Order Denying

defense

should

not

be

regarding discretionary decisions.
imposition
of
penalty
is
with the Industrial Accidents
amount of penalty is fixed by
statute and cannot be altered.

Motion

For

Review, dated

August 30,

2000, page 3, citing § 34A-2-211(2), which provides,
in part:
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The penalty imposed under Subsection (2)(a)
shall be the greater of:
(i) $1,000; or
(ii) three times the amount of the premium
the employer would have paid for workers'
compensation insurance . . .
Anabasis

claims

the

record

shows

the

labor

commission does not, did not, and never will, exercise
discretion in imposing a § 34A-2-211(2) penalty.
Anabasis also argues that an inadequate
factual basis exists to support the Division's
exercise of discretion in penalizing Anabasis.
The Appeals Board finds no merit to this
argument. To the contrary, the basis for the
Division's
imposition
of penalty
against
Anabasis have been set forth in the orders of
the Division and the ALJ [Administrative Law
Judge],
as well
as
in
this
decision.
Furthermore, Anabasis does not challenge any
of the facts on which the penalty is based.
Under the circumstances, there has been no
abuse of discretion in the imposition of
penalty against Anabasis pursuant to §34A~2211(2).
Order Denying Motion
2000, page 4.

For Review, dated

(Addendum 43, R. 71.)

August 30,

The claim that

the labor commission never has waived the penalty is
supported by the record, quoted at some length below.
The abuse of administrative discretion is in the labor
commission not exercising discretion at all.

Instead,

the labor commission has a set and standard policy not
to waive the penalty.

In the Reply Brief Of Anabasis,

dated August 13, 1999, page 5 (Addendum 29, R. 43),
Anabasis objected to the labor commission's policy on
exercising

administrative discretion under § 34A-2-

211, as follows:
At the hearing the administrative law judge
25

stated there appears to be some evidence that
the Labor Commission exercised discretion in
deciding to impose a penalty.
That finding
should be reconsidered in light of the Labor
Commission's assertion to the contrary in its
brief.
"The Division has exercised its
discretion simply by its act of imposing a
penalty in this matter . . .
Although the
Division
vehemently
disagrees
with
Respondent's arguments in this regard, the
fact that the Division chose to penalize for
[a specific time period] is also an exercise
of discretion."
(Br. p 6.)
[Brief Of
Industrial
Accidents
Division
&
Closing
Arguments, dated July 26, 1999. (Addendum 22,
R. 36).]
That is not an exercise of
administrative
discretion.
That
is
a
"vehement" statement of policy not to exercise
discretion. The Labor Commission's "vehement"
statement of policy reasonably leads counsel
to assume it has never exercised, and will
never
exercise,
its
discretion
to
not
penalize, or to reduce the penalty, in
appropriate circumstances calling for the
sound exercise of administrative discretion as
required by the statute.
Anabasis submits
that a finding the Labor Commission exercised
its discretion cannot be reasonably made in
light of the Labor Commission's "vehement"
statement of policy to the contrary.
Also, in Anabasis' Motion For Review, dated May 5,
2000, 12, page 2, (Addendum 38, R. 57):
2. The administrative law judge erred in not
making a finding of fact or conclusion of law
that the Division exercised discretion.
The
findings of fact and conclusions of law are
not adequate to support the penalty part of
the order. The conclusion that "The choice to
impose a penalty or not, is in fact a
discretionary act" is an interpretation of the
statute. It is not a finding of fact that the
Division did
an act amounting
to such
exercise, nor is it a conclusion of law that
discretion was exercised by such act.
A
finding of fact or conclusion of law that the
Division properly exercised discretion cannot
be made because the Division never has and
never will exercise discretion, its policy
being stated in its Brief dated July 26, 1999
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[Brief Of Industrial Accidents Division &
Closing Arguments. (Addendum 22, R. 36.)]
"The Division has exercised its discretion
simply by its act of imposing a penalty in
this matter . . .
Although the Division
vehemently
disagrees
with
Respondent's
arguments in this regard, the fact that the
Division chose to penalize for [a specific
time
period]
is
also
an
exercise
of
discretion."
(Br. p. 6.)
[Brief Of
Industrial
Accidents
Division
&
Closing
Arguments. (Addendum 22, R. 36.)]
Always
imposing the maximum penalty all the time is
an exercise of policy not an exercise of
discretion, and is contrary to law.
The
division may not refuse to exercise discretion
under the statute.
There are facts in the
record justifying an exercise of discretion.
Anabasis reasonably believed it had purchased
full business insurance coverage and was
unaware of this gap in coverage until notified
by the division. The administrative law judge
found that no workers compensation claim has
ever been made against Anabasis.
The Labor
Commission makes the dubious argument that the
purpose of the law is to generate revenue in
its Brief dated July 26, 1999, page 4. [Brief
Of Industrial Accidents Division & Closing
Arguments. (Addendum 20, R. 42.)] Any claim
the Division ever exercises discretion should
be viewed with enormous skepticism.
The
administrative law judge is in error in
stating "Anabasis has not provided any case
law that would allow the Division, the
Administrative
Law Judge, or
the
Labor
Commission to impose, reduce, or suspend that
$1,000 penalty." Anabasis did not cite case
law
because
it
cited
statutory
law,
specifically
"the division may impose a
penalty" at § 34A-2-211(2) (a) .
Case law is
not necessary to understand the word "may"
means discretionary.
There is no applicable case law on § 34A-2-211(2)(a).
The
abuse

of

appropriate

remedy

discretion

based

for
on

an

administrative

unauthorized

agency

policy should be reversal of the agency's decision,
not

merely

referring

the
27

matter

back

to

make

additional pro forma findings of fact.

Referral back

for additional findings is not a credible process when
the agency has a history of exercising a policy it is
not authorized to make.

The evidence in the record is

clear, uncontroverted and supports the Anabasis' claim
that the labor commission has a firmly fixed policy
not to waive the penalty.

Remanding the case for more

adequate findings will not add value to this review.
POINT III
ANABASIS IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
Standard of review.

This issue is not here on

review.
Litigation

expense

awards

are

authorized

in

appeals from administrative decisions by § 78-27a-5.
"This court

has

interpreted

attorney

fee

statutes

broadly so as to award attorney fees on appeal where a
statute initially authorizes them."

Salmon v. Davis

County, 916 P.2d 890f 895 (Utah 1996).
Anabasis
attorney

asks

the

fees pursuant

Court

of Appeals

to

award

to the Small Business Equal

Access to Justice Act, § 78-27a-l, et seg.
78-27a-5. Litigation expense award authorized
in appeals from administrative decisions.
(1) In any civil judicial appeal taken
from an administrative decision regarding a
matter in which the administrative action was
commenced by the state, and which involves the
business regulatory functions of the state, a
court may award reasonable litigation expenses
to any small business which is a named party
if the small business prevails in the appeal
28

and the court finds that the state action was
undertaken without substantial justification.
Section 78-27a-5, authorizing an attorney fees
award to a small business on appeal, is not the same
as

§

78-27-56, authorizing

sanctions

including

an

award of attorney fees in civil actions for bad faith.
The differences are § 78-27a-5 provides the Court "may
award reasonable litigation expenses" on appeal if the
"court finds the state action was undertaken without
substantial justificationf" while § 78-27-6 provides
the Court "shall award reasonable attorney's fees . . .
if the court determines that the action or defense to
the

action

was

without

asserted in good faith."

merit

and

not

brought

or

(All emphasis added.)

If this is viewed as a distinction without a
difference, then the Small Business Equal Access to
Justice Act is merely a euphemism making § 78-27-6 bad
faith sanctions available to hapless small businesses
abused

by

unreasonable

administrative

action.

Anabasis submits that the sanctions authorized by §
78-27-6

and

11(c)(1)(A),
including

apply

this

"sanctions."
language.

Utah

Rules

Civil

generally

case.

Rule

to
11

Procedure,
all
uses

Rule

litigation,
the

word

Section 78-27-6 is worded in sanctions

The Small Business Equal Access to Justice

Act is worded like an attorney fees clause.
29

The Small

Business

Equal

Access

to

Justice

Act

§

78-27a-5

requires "substantial justification" for undertaking
state administrative action.

Undertaking state action

with merely some justification is not acceptable under
§ 78-27a-5, while a litigant, and its attorney, avoids
sanction if there is some justification under § 78-276 and Rule 11(c)(1)(A).

Substantial justification and

some justification is a distinction with a difference.
Anabasis submits § 78-27a-5 is a genuine attorney fees
clause authorizing the Appeals Court to award attorney
fees when the administrative

action was taken with

merely some justification, if any at all, but short of
"substantial justification."
Rule

33

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure, containing the words "shall award," is a
sanctions rule similar to Rule 11(c) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, containing the word "may."

The

standards of Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P.; Rule 33, Utah
R. App. P.; and § 78-27-6 should not apply to the
Small Business Equal Access to Justice Act.

Rule

34(b) & (e), Utah R. App. P., allows "an award of
costs

for

or

against

the

state"

or

its

agencies

"unless specifically required or prohibited by law."
Counsel is unaware of any such prohibition.

Counsel

notes that the right of a small business to attorney
fees under the Small Business Equal Access to Justice
30

Act does not appear to be reciprocal under the Act, or
under

§

78-27-56.5

which

applies

reciprocity

to

attorney fee clauses in "a civil action based upon any
promissory notef written contract, or other writing."
Pursuant to § 78-27a-3 the small business must
prevail against the state to be awarded attorney fees.
(1) "Prevail" means to obtain favorable final
judgment, the right to all appeals having been
exhausted, on the merits, on substantially all
counts or charges in the action and with
respect to the most significant issue or set
of issues presented, but does not include the
settlement
of
any
action,
either
by
stipulation, consent decree or otherwise,
whether or not settlement occurs before or
after any hearing or trial.
(2) "Reasonable litigation expenses11 means
court costs, administrative hearing costs,
attorney's fees, and witness fees of all
necessary witnesses, not in excess of $10,000,
which a court finds were reasonably incurred
in opposing action covered under this act.
(3) "Small business" means a commercial or
business
entity,
including
a
sole
proprietorship, which does not have more than
250 employees, . . .
(4) "State" means any department, board,
institution . . . of the state of Utah . . .
Rule

4-505

Administration

of

the

Code

"shall govern the award

fees in the trial courts."

request

Judicial

of attorney

The Utah Court of Appeals

is the trial court on a § 78-27a-5
request.

Of

attorney

fees

Counsel assumes a Rule 4-505 attorney fees
should

be

submitted

by motion, notice and

supporting affidavit, and if disputed, heard on the
law and motion calendar, after the Court of Appeals
first decides whether attorney fees may be awarded.
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This is the same procedure used in District Courts.
Counsel

can

find

no

rule

authorizing

a

party

to

initially seek this relief in its brief; however, Rule
33(c)(1), Utah R. App. P., allows a sanctions request
"as part of appellee's brief."
The action taken by the labor commission was not
correct, as also discussed in Points I and II.

Its

findings

on

not

credibly

explained.

the

exercise

of

discretion

are

Its conclusion of law on

the

meaning of the statute supports a dubious policy of
revenue generation.

The labor commission

knowingly

and intentionally imposed a penalty contrary to the
plain language of the statute.

The labor commission

claimed and emphasized punitive and revenue generating
powers, as

illustrated

by

its Brief

Of

Industrial

Accidents Division & Closing Arguments, Points V, VI &
VII, dated July 26, 1999, p 4, (Addendum 20, R. 34).
The labor commission's "action was undertaken without
substantial justification" because it (1) interpreted
a

statute

challenged,

contrary
(2)

to

abused

its
its

plain

language

discretion

by

when

ignoring

Anabasis' request to exercise discretion, and (3) was
motivated by a policy always to generate revenue and
punish small business by abuse of a statute allowing
compliance before imposition of a penalty.
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CONCLUSION
Section 34A-2-211 is not ambiguous and needs no
interpretation to carry out the intended purpose of
the Workers' Compensation Act.

The decision of the

labor commission should be reversed, and not merely
remanded

for

more

findings.

Anabasis

should

be

awarded attorney fees and costs.
DATED: January

/

, 2 001.

CARRIE A. CARMICHAEL
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This certifies that the undersigned served the
foregoing

Brief

Of

Petitioner

this

/^

day

of

January 2001, by mailing two copies first class mail
with sufficient postage prepaid to the following:
Sheryl M. Hayashi
Alan Hennebold
Attorneys for Respondent
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
PO Box 146600
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6600

r^y^s^t^

&

(j^A^/d^^

LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL
Attorney for Petitioner
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Addendum
Contents:
Addendum Page
A. Reproduction of parts of the record:
Notice of Noncompliance In Providing Workers'
Compensation Insurance Coveragef dated
January 6, 1999
..
Notice Of Noncompliance And Intent To Assess
Penalty, with penalty computation attached,
dated February 12, 1999

1

2-4

Answer To Notice Of Noncompliance And Intent
To Assess Penalty dated February 16, 1999 . • 4a-4b
Letter from Labor Commission, dated March 3,
1999, stating "penalty will not be waived."

5-6

Determination & Order Declaring Noncompliance
& Assessing A Penalty of $1,000 dated March 3,
1999
7-9
Anabasis' Appeal And Request For Hearing On
Determination And Order Declaring
Noncompliance and Assessing A Penalty dated
March 28, 1999

10-14

Letter from Labor Commission, dated March 30,
1999, stating "penalty will not be waived." 15-16
Brief Of Industrial Accidents Division and
Closing Arguments, dated July 26, 1999 .... 17-24
Reply Brief Of Anabasis, dated August 13,
1999

25-31

Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And
Order by Donald L. George, Administrative Law
Judge, Utah Labor Commission, Adjudication
Division, dated April 14, 2000
32-36
Anabasis' Motion For Review dated May 5, 2000 37-39
Order Denying Motion For Review, by Appeals
Board, Utah Labor Commission, dated August
30, 2000
-l-

40-45

B. Reproduction of determinative statutes and rules.
Utah Code
34A-1-303
34A-2-210
34A-2-211

Annotated
Review of administrative decision • •
Power to bring suit for noncompliance
Notice of noncompliance to employerEnforcement power of division—
Penalty
34A-2-417 Claims and benefits — Time limits
for filing — Burden of proof
34A-2-704 Uninsured Employers1 Fund
63-46b-16 Judicial review — Formal
adjudicative proceedings
78-27a-l Small Business Equal Access to
Justice Act, title
78-27a-3 Definitions
78-27a-5 Litigation expense award authorized
in appeals from administrative
decisions

46-47
47
47-49
49-50
50-53
53-54
54
54-55
55

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 11 Signing of pleadings, motions, and
other papers; representations to
Court; sanctions

55-56

Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Rule 4-505 Attorney fees affidavits

56-57

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 33 Damages for delay or frivolous appeal;
recovery of attorney fees
57-58
Rule 34 Award of costs
58-59
(Some copies in the Addendum are from Anabasis' file
instead of
copies from the labor commission's file
because some originals were not found in the labor
commission's file when Anabasis obtained copies from
the labor commission for inclusion in its Addendum.
A comment in the Record Index states, ''It appears
that the attachments to this have been removed and
entered as hearing exhibits.")
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LABOR COMMISSION
DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS
Michael O Leavitt
Governor

R Lee Ellertson

January 6,1999

Joyce A Sewell, Director
Division of Industrial Accidents
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
PO Box 146610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610
(801) 530-6800
(800) 530-5090
(801) 530-6804 (FAX)
(801) 530-7685 (TDD)

Commissioner

Anabasis Inc
130 N Fairfield Rd
LaytonUT 84040

NOTICE
NON COMPLIANCE IN PROVIDING WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE COVERAGE
The Labor Commission of Utah has been notified that your company's workers' compensation
insurance policy is canceled or you have never had a policy.
Please provide proof of workers' compensation insurance to the Labor Commission.
Failure to maintain workers' compensation insurance for your employees could result in a penalty
being assessed against the company as well as legal action to close your business if you don't
maintain insurance coverage.
*If you have coverage in place, please contact your insurance carrier and tell them to send the correct
information to NCCL
If you have any questions, contact Carma R Weis at (801) 530-6840 or toll free within Utah 1-800530-5090.
Sincerely,

Carma R Weis
Compliance Officer
*(
)I do have workers' compensation insurance (Notify your insurance carrier).
(
)I do not have workers' compensation insurance (Please explain below).
REMARKS:
Insurance Carrier:
Policy Number:
Print Name:
Signed by:

Carrier Phone:
Effective Date:
Phone:
Date:

.

98-10-85827/crw
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THE LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610

In the Matter of the Noncompliance of:
Anabasis Inc
130 N Fairfield Rd
LaytonUT 84040

* NOTICE OF NONCOMPLIANCE
* AND INTENT TO ASSESS PENALTY
CASE No: 98-10-85827

The Labor Commission of Utah has received information indicating that you have failed to maintain
workers' compensation insurance coverage, as required by §34A-2-201, Utah Code Ann., of the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act. The Labor Commission therefore commences this adjudicatory proceeding
to determine whether you are liable for the penalties established by §34A-2-21 l(2)(b), Utah Code Ann., of
the Act.
Based on the information shown on the attached worksheet, the Labor Commission proposes to
assess a penalty of $16.87 per week, $2.41 per day or $1,000. whichever is greater for any and all time
periods of noncompliance from November 02, 1998 to January 12, 1999.
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-4, adjudicative proceedings will be conducted informally.
You may submit any relevant information in writing to the Presiding Officer indicated below within 15 days
from the date of this Notice. The Presiding Officer will then issue a penalty determination based on the
information available to the Labor Commission.
NOTE: In addition to the penalty which may be imposed against you pursuant to this adjudicative
proceeding, the Labor Commission will also proceed with legal action to close your business if you do not
provide proof that you have now obtained workers' compensation insurance coverage.
If you have any questions, contact Carma R Weis at (801) 530-6840 or toll free in Utah at 1-800530-5090.
Date: February 12, 1999,
•#>

H^1^-^1

Joytfe A. Sewell
Presiding Officer

Addendum page 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

On February 12. 1999.1 mailed, first class postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
INTENT TO ASSESS PENALTY, with enclosures listed below, to each of the following:

Anabasis Inc
130 N Fairfield Rd
LaytonUT 84040

IdA*
e^eCarma R Weis
Compliance Officer
Enclosures:
1.
Exhibit A: Penalty worksheet
2.
Exhibit B: Copy of Utah Law

Addendum p a g e 3

No: 98-10-85827
asis Inc
Fairfield Rd
n UT 84040
544-3500

11/02/1998 to 01/12/1999
T31.00

x

50% Utah Avg
teekly Wage)

3

x

(Highest # of
Employees)

0.0077

=

$16.89
(Weekly Imputed Rate)

(Rate)

($487.00)

$16.89

Divided By

(Weekly
Imputed
Rate)

7
(Days)

Total Penalty i s :
Computation Date:
Impact Rating:

$1,000.00
02/12/1999

Addendum page 4

*

$2.41
(Daily
Imputed
Rate)

x

72
(# of Days
Without
Coverage)

•

$173.52
(Penalty or $1,000.00
whichever is
GREATER)

LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL (580)
Attorney for Anabasis Inc
130 North Fairfield
LaytonUT 84041-3926
(801) 546-9888

COPY

LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
PO Box 146610
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6610
In the Matter of the Noncompliance of

)

Anabasis Inc
130 N Fairfield Rd
Layton UT 84041

)

ANSWER TO NOTICE OF NONCOMPLIANCE
AND INTENT TO ASSESS PENALTY

)

CASE No. 98-10-85827

Anabasis Inc answers the Notice of Noncompliance and Intent to Assess Penalty
dated February 12,1999, as follows:
1. The average weekly wage is $137, not $487 as alleged in the penalty worksheet,
Exhibit A attached to the notice of noncompliance.
2. Anabasis Inc has workers' compensation insurance through State Farm Insurance.
Agent, Bryon Lilijcnquist Insurance Agency, Inc., 1398 North Hillfield Road, Layton, Utah 84041,
telephone (801) 546-6108.
3. The alleged default was remedied within 15 days after delivery of the notice as
allowed by Section 32A-2-211(b), Utah Code Annotated.
4. The imposition of a penalty is not mandatory under § 34A-2-211(2)(a) which
provides, in part, "the division may impose a penalty against the employer," Emphasis added.
5. Pursuant to § 34A-2-211(2)(ii) the division may not impose a penalty because
Anabasis Inc is conducting business with workers' compensation insurance. Any default has been
cured with the time allowed by § 32A-2-211 (b).
6. A $1,000 penalty is confiscatory and unconscionable under the circumstances of
an average weekly wage of $137.
WHEREFORE, no penalty determination should be issued.
DATED: February 16,1999.
/s/ Larrie A. Carmichael
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL
Attorney for Anabasis Inc
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This certifies that the undersigned mailed the foregoing Answer To Notice Of
Noncompliance And Intent To Assess Penalty to the following this 16th day of February 1999.
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
PO Box 146610
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6610
/s/ Larrie A. Carmichael
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL
Attorney for Anabasis Inc

ANSWER
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LABOR COMMISSION
DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS
Michael 0 Leavitt
Governor

R Lee Ellertson
Commissioner

March 3,1999

Joyce A Sewell, Director
Division of Industrial Accidents
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
PO Box 146610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610
(801) 530-6800
(800) 530-5090
(801) 530-6804 (FAX)
(801) 530-7685 (TDD)

Larrie A Carmichael
Attorney for Anabasis Inc
130 N Fairfield
LaytonUT 84041
To Whom it May Concern:
This Letter comes in response to your letter regarding the penalty for non compliance with
Utah Law §34A-2-201 requiring an employer to provide workers' compensation insurance for its
employees.
In your answer to our Notice of Noncompliance you state the average weekly wage is $137,
not $487. We are referring to the Utah average weekly wage at 150 % as designated by the Utah
Legislature.
You also state that Anabasis is currently covered where in actuality, according to a
conversation we had with Bryon Liljenquist, your insurance agent, an application had been
submitted but not accepted at the time you state you were covered. We still have not received proof
of coverage in the form of a certificate or electronically thru our designee, NCCI. Section 32A-1211(b) refers only to the matter of time to respond, not the matter of time to secure workers'
compensation insurance.
You state that the imposition of a penalty is not mandatory but it is up to the discretion of
the Presiding Officer to make that decision. The default has not be "cured" and the law states that
an employer should have workers' compensation insurance from the time of hire, not fifteen (15
days after they were found to not have workers' compensation insurance in place.
The Commission can certainly understand financial difficulties within a business; however,
non compliance with Utah Law cannot be simply overlooked. Workers' compensation law requiring
an employer to have insurance is no different from the requirement to have a contractor's license or
a permit to build. The legislature has determined that failure to provide insurance, just as failure to
obtain a license or permit, will result in severe penalties.
Addendum p a g e
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Based on the above information and the fact there was no insurance in effect during the time
period penalized for by the commission the penalty will not be waived.
Sincerely,
jL^<t^>
^ JoyceASewell
Presiding Office
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STATE OF UTAH
LABOR COMMISSION
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610

In the Matter of the Noncompliance of:

*
*
*
*
*

Anabasis Inc
130 N Fairfield Rd
Layton UT 84 040

DETERMINATION AND ORDER
DECLARING NONCOMPLIANCE AND
ASSESSING A PENALTY
CASE No: 98-10-85827

DETERMINATION
The Labor Commission of Utah hereby finds that Anabasis Inc failed to
provide workers' compensation insurance for it employees as required by law from
November 02, 1998 to January 12, 1999.
The Highest number of employees working for Anabasis Inc during the period
of noncompliance was 3, with the highest rated employee class code of 9586 Barber
Or Beauty Shop. Using the rate and rate multipliers of 0.0077 for November 02,
1998 to January 12, 1999 for 72 days of noncompliance and 150% of the state's
average weekly wage, resulting in a penalty assessment of $1,000.00.
ORDER
Pursuant to §34A-2-201/ Utah Code Ann., Anabasis Inc is ordered to pay
$1,000.00 to the Uninsured Employers' Fund as a penalty for noncompliance for the
time period of: November 02, 1998 to January 12, 19 99.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that should this ORDER go to collection that
this judgement shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable cost & attorney's
fees expended in collecting said judgement.
If you disagree with this DETERMINATION and ORDER, you have THIRTY (30) DAYS
to appeal pursuant to §34A-2-211(4), Utah Code Ann., or this order becomes final.
Any appeal shall be made to the Labor Commission and must specify the facts and
reasons for objecting to the order.

DATE ORDER ISSUED : 3 7c3 / ??
/

/

By: L^ „ <_ , &^ Ay^uL^tf
/jhycp A. Sewell
^Director, Industrial Accidents Division

APPEAL PROCESS IS ON ATTACHED SHEET

APPEAL PROCESS

Addendum page

Pursuant to §34A-2-801, Utah Code Ann., a party aggrieved by this Order may
appeal by filing a request for a hearing with the Adjudication Division of the
Labor Commission. Pursuant to §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann., any such request for
hearing must be received by the Adjudication Division within 30 days from the
date this Order is signed and must state the grounds on which the appeal is
based. Appeals should be mailed to the following address:
Larry Williams
State Of Utah
Labor Commission
P.O. Box 146612
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6612
The employer's appeal shall specify the facts that are in question and the
basis of the employer's objection to the determination, imposition, or the amount
of the penalty.
Any appeal must be received by the Labor Commission
within 30 days of the date of issuance in writing.
If appeals are not received within the 30 day rule
all appeal rights are forfeited.
An administrative hearing will be held in accordance with §34A-2-801, Utah
Code Annotated.
After a penalty order has been issued and becomes final, the commission may
file an abstract for any uncollected penalty in district court. The abstract
shall state the amount of the uncollected penalty, reasonable attorney's fees,
cost of collection, and court cost. The filed abstract shall have the effect of
a judgement of that court. §34A-2-211(5), Utah Code Annotated

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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On
_, I mailed, first class postage prepaid, a copy of the
foregoing DETERMINATION AND ORDER DECLARING NONCOMPLIANCE AND ASSESSING A PENALTY,
to each of the following:

Anabasis Inc
130 N Fairfield Rd
Layton UT 84040

-

'~6*<L*
Carma R Weis
Compliance Officer
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LARRIEA. CARMICHAEL (580)
Attorney for Anabasis Inc
130 North Fairfield
Layton UT 84041-3926
(801) 546-9888
STATE OP UTAH
LABOR COMMISSION
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
PO Box 146610
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6610
In the Matter of the Noncompliance
of
ANABASIS INC
130 N Fairfield Rd
Layton UT 84041

)

APPEAL AND REQUEST FOR HEARING
ON
)
DETERMINATION AND ORDER DECLARING
NONCOMPLIANCE AND ASSESSING A PENALTY
)
)

Case No. 98-10-85827
APPEAL

1. Anabasis Inc appeals and requests a hearing before an administrative law judge on
the Labor Commission's Determination And Order Declaring Noncompliance And Assessing A
Penalty dated March 3, 1999, copy attached hereto, pursuant to Section 63-46b-12 of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act, Section 34A-2-211(4), Utah Code Annotated, and written
instructions attached to the Determination and Order.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
2. On appeal Anabasis seeks a reasonable exercise of discretion on findings and
penalty. Anabasis submits that a $1,000.00 penalty is not reasonable nor mandatory in this matter.
A reasonable exercise of discretion is authorized by § 34A-2-21 l(2)(a), UCA. A reasonable finding
0*

of fact and conclusion of law would be substantial compliance with law on the part of Anabasis.

ja

reasonable penalty would be no penalty.

&
i^-j
^

o

A

FACTS
3. Anabasis Inc is a Utah corporation operating a beauty salon at 130 N Fairfield
Rd., Layton, Utah 84041. Anabasis Inc has been in the beauty salon business continuously for a
number of years and has complied with all laws, regulations, rules, ordinances, standards, procedures
and practices applicable to its business.

4. The beauty salon is operated b) the two owners of Anabasis Inc, John H.
Carmichael and Sandie Carmichael, brother and sister. They work as owners and shareholders of
Anabasis Inc, not as employees. Tax returns are filed as a Subchapter S corporation issuing K-l's
instead of W-2's to report the owners' draws, income and losses. The owners are not required to be
covered by workers' compensation insurance. Part-time employees are now covered by workers'
compensation insurance, and they are issued W-2's.
5. Anabasis employs some part-time help to wash hair.

Other work, such as

bookkeeping, janitorial and snow removal is done by independent contractors. Anabasis has tenants
which are not all in the beauty salon business. Tenants are not connected to Anabasis' business,
except to operate in the same building.
6. Anabasis relies on its insurance carrier to provide all business insurance coverage.
Insurance is one of many services Anabasis relies on independent contractors to perform. Anabasis
had no idea, or reason to know, that there was any gap in insurance coverage until it received a letter
from the Labor Commission. Counsel does not have a copy of the initial letter from the Labor
Commission. Upon receipt of the initial letter from the Labor Commission, Anabasis immediately
contacted its insurance carrier and obtained workers' compensation insurance.
workers' compensation insurance through State Farm Insurance.

Anabasis has

Agent, Bryon Lilijenquist

Insurance Agency, Inc., 1398 North Hillfield Road, Layton, Utah 84041, telephone (801) 546-6108.
A copy of the workers' Compensation And Employers Liability Policy Information Page is attached
hereto.
7. No action, claim or inquiry has ever been made concerning a compensable
>

industrial accident or occupational decease with this business.

(D

p
0

8. Labor Commission served a Notice of Noncompliance and Intent to Assess
Penalty dated February 12,1999. Counsel does not have a copy of it.
9. On February 16, 1999, Anabasis served its Answer to the Notice of

CO

Noncompliance and Intent to Assess Penalty. A copy of the Answer is attached hereto.
10. By letter dated March 3, 1999, the Labor Commission responded to the Answer to

APPEAL & REQUEST FOR HEARING
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the Notice of Noncompliance and Intent to Assess Penalty. This letter rejected the Answer in whole.
A copy of the letter is attached hereto.
11. Verification of workers' -compensation coverage was given to the Labor
Commission before it issued its 3-3-99 Determination And Order. Counsel does not yet have written
documentation, if any, of such verification, but will offer documentary or other evidence if required.
12. Labor Commission issued its Determination And Order Declaring Noncompliance
And Assessing A Penalty dated March 3, 1999. A copy was not mailed to counsel of record.
GROUNDS AND ARGUMENT
13. Anabasis repeats and adds to the points made in its 2-12-99 Answer, as follows.
14. Obviously, the Labor Commission read, but did not consider, the points raised in
Anabasis' Answer dated February 16, 1999. For example, the following statement set forth in the
Labor Commission letter dated 3-3-99 is not logical or responsive to paragraph number 1 of
Anabasis' Answer: "In your answer to our Notice of Noncompliance you state the average weekly
wage is $137, not $487. We are referring to the Utah average weekly wage at 150% as designated
by the Utah Legislature." The quoted statement is not correct or informative. A like example, "You
state that the imposition of a penalty is not mandatory . . . the law states that an employer should
have workers' compensation insurance from the time of hire, not fifteen (15) days after they were
found to not have workers' compensation insurance in place." This last example shows the Labor
Commission read Anabasis' 2-16-99 Answer, but not "the law," which was cited, quoted and
emphasized in the Answer. Section 32A-2-211(b) does in fact state, "remedy the default within 15
days after delivery of the notice." Emphasis added. The rest of the Labor Commissions' 3-3-99
>

letter cites "NCCI," whatever that isy and impojrtunes Anabasis to comply with tews. Th& Zxniur

(D

Commission did not exercise discretionary powers mandated by the legislature.

£
15. The average weekly wage is $137, not $487 as alleged in the penalty worksheet,
3
•*$ Exhibit A attached to the notice of noncompliance. Counsel no longer has a copy of Exhibit A.
$>

^
£j

16. Anabasis has workers' compensation insurance through State Farm Insurance.
Agent, Bryon Lilijenquist Insurance Agency, Inc., 1398 North Hillfield Road, Layton, Utah 84041,
telephone (801) 546-6108. A copy of the Workers Compensation And Employers Liability Policy
APPEAL & REQUEST FOR HEARING
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Information Page is attached hereto.
&

17. The alleged default was remedied within 15 days after delivery of the notice as

CD

S

allowed by Section 32A-2-211(b), Utah Code Annotated, by immediate notice to the insurance

3

carrier. Counsel does not have precise dates, anc submits that precise dates are not decisive in a

ru

discretionary matter. Workers' compensation is mandatory insurance obtainable from only state

(D
(A)

owned or state regulated carriers; and all being exempt for antitrust and many other laws, have little
sense of urgency in providing the service which should have been given Anabasis as requested and
reasonably expected by it. An adverse ruling here could be the basis for a negligence suit against the
insurance carrier; except the insurance carrier could defend on the grounds that it is not responsible
for too strict an application of discretionary law by an administrative agency, and claiming it can
take its own sweet time in dealing with a long established customer.
18. The imposition of a penalty is not mandatory under § 34A-2-211(2)(a) which
provides, in part, 'the division may impose a penalty against the employer." Emphasis added.
19. Pursuant to § 34A-2-211(2)(ii) the division may not impose a penalty because
Anabasis is conducting business with workers' compensation insurance. Any default has been cured

U)
with the time allowed by § 32A-2-211(b), which provides in part, "remedy the default within 15 days
after delivery of the notice." Emphasis added.
20. A $1,000 penalty is excessive and unconscionable under the circumstances of an
average weekly wage of $137.
CONCLUSION
On the facts and the law, and by the exercise of reasonable discretion, Anabasis
should be found in substantial compliance with the workers' compensation law, and no penalty
should be imposed. Discretionary power includes the power to find substantial compliance to be
adequate compliance. On review the administrative law judge has the same discretionary power as
that given to the Labor Commission.
DATED: March 28,1999.
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL
Attorney for Anabasis Inc
APPEAL & REQUEST FOR HEARING
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CERTIFICATE CF MAILING
This certifies that the undersigned mailed the foregoing Request For Hearing On
Determination And Order Declaring Noncompliance And Assessing A Penalty to the following this
28th day of March 1999.
Larry Williams
State of Utah
LABOR COMMISSION
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
PO Box 146612
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6612
ANABASIS INC
130 North Fairfield
LaytonUT 84041
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL
Attorney for Anabasis Inc

&
(0

a
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LABOR COMMISSION
DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS
Michael O. Leavitt
Governor

R. Lee Ellertson
Commissioner

March 30,1999

Joyce A. Sewell, Director
Division of Industrial Accidents
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
PO Box 146610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610
(801) 530-6800
(800) 530-5090
(801) 530-6804 (FAX)
(801) 530-7685 (TDD)

LARRIE A CARMICHAEL (580)
130 N FAIRFIELD
LAYTON UT 84041-3926

ANABASIS INC
130 N FAIRFIELD
LAYTONUT 84041-3926
Dear Mr. Carmichael;
This Letter comes in response to your letter regarding the penalty for non compliance with
Utah Law §34A-2-201 requiring an employer to provide workers' compensation insurance for its
employees.
An investigation was opened for Anabasis Inc. for having employees and no workers'
compensation insurance. The section §34A-2-211 la & lb deals with an employer who does not
have workers' compensation insurance. If they do not have coverage with fifteen (15) days the
commission can get a District Judge to issue a restraining order to shut the business down until
coverage is obtained. However, section §34A-2-211 2a-d specifies the penalty that may be imposed.
The Statue §34A-2-201 determines how the calculations for the penalties are done. We can also go
back three (3) years on a penalty and we use the higher of the actual penalty or $1,000.
A company has employees full-time, part-time or any-time they must have workers'
compensation insurance. It is up to the employer, not the insurance carrier, to make sure they have
workers' compensation insurance. Workers' compensation insurance can be purchased from 218
carriers that are licensed by the Utah Insurance Commission to write workers' comp. Anabasis Inc
dba John's Salon has been in business since 1994 without workers' compensation insurance. Job
Service has shown six (6) employees during that time. The penalty will remain at $1,000.00.
The Commission can certainly understand financial difficulties within a business; however,
non compliance with Utah Law cannot be simply overlooked. Workers' compensation law requiring
an employer to have insurance is no different from the requirement to have a contractor's license or
a permit to build. The legislature has determined that failure to provide insurance, just as failure to
obtain a license or permit, will result in severe penalties.
Addendum p a g e
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Based on the above information and the fact there was no insurance in effect during the time
period penalized for by the commission the penalty will not be waived. Your appeal of the penalty
will be sent to the Adjudication Division to be scheduled for a hearing.
Sincerely,

1/ JoyceASewell
Presiding Officer
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SHERYL M. HAYASHI (6397)
Attorney for Industrial Accidents Division
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
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In The Matter of the Noncompliance of:

*
*
*
*
*
*

ANABASIS INC
130 N. Fairfield Road
Layton, UT 84041
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& CLOSING ARGUMENTS
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ARGUMENT
Respondent contends the Division cannot impose a penalty pursuant to §34A-2-211(2)(B)
while the employer is conducting business with worker's compensation insurance.
Respondent contends the Division's authority to impose a penalty ceases upon an
employer securing worker's compensation insurance for its employees. This assertion is clearly
not within the meaning or intent of the Workers Compensation Act when read as a whole.
Respondent's argument that employers are somehow absolved of liability for a penalty for a
lapse in workers compensation coverage simply by securing coverage is completely without
merit.
Respondent asserts the plain meaning of the statute is that the penalty provision only
applies when the "employer is conducting business without securing worker's compensation
coverage." [Respondent's Hearing Brief]. However, Respondent fails to mention that the
penalty language of Section 34A-2-21 l(2)(a)(ii) is directly tied to the statutory language
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imposing upon employers a clear cut responsibility to maintain continuous and ongoing coverage
of workers compensation insurance. In looking at the section cited by Respondent, Section 34A2-211 (2) states in relevant part,
Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the division may impose a penalty against the
employer under this Subsection (2)*

(o...
(ii)

If the division believes that an employer of one or more employees
is conducting business without securing the payment of benefits in
one of the three ways provided Section 34A-2-201.

In this particular case, Section 34A-2-201(l)(b), requires that employers shall secure the
payment of workers' compensation benefits for their employees "by insuring and keeping
insured, the payment of compensation with any stock corporation or mutual association
authorized to transact the business of workers' compensation in this state..."

[emphasis added]

The statute does not merely require that employers currently insure payment of compensation,
but that such insurance must be continuous and ongoing, hence the language "keeping insured."
When Section 34A-2-211(2) is read in conjunction with 34A-2-201, the language clearly
states the division may impose a penalty against the employer if the division believes that an
employer of one or more employees is conducting business without securing the payment of
benefits by . . . insuring, and "keeping" insured, workers compensation benefits for their
employees. An employer's failure to "keep" its business insured is a violation for which the
Division may impose a penalty, without regard to whether the employer is currently insured.
At most, the language is ambiguous. When interpreting an ambiguous statute, we first try
to discover the underlying intent of the legislature, guided by the purpose of the statute as a
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whole and the legislative history. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co ofUtah. 353 ?.2d 877, 830 (Utah
1993). The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect of the intent of the legislature
in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. Sullivan. 853 P.2d 877 at 880, Nixon v.
Salt Lake Citv Corp. 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995).,
In clarifying any ambiguous statutory language, it is appropriate to look at language
within the same section for guidance. A statute should be construed as a whole, with all of its
provisions construed to be harmonious with each other and with the overall legislative objective
of the statute. Utah State Road Commn'n v. Friberg. 687 P.2d 821, 831 (Utah 1984). The
language of the accompanying penalty provisions within Section 34A-2-211 clearly refer in past
tense to periods of lapse in coverage. Section 34-A-2-211(b) speaks in terms of imposing a
penalty "three times the amount of the premium the employer should have paid for workers
compensation insurance based on the rate filing of the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
during the period of noncompliance." [emphasis added]. In addition, Section 34A-2-211(d)
refers to "The payroll basis for the purpose of calculating the premium penalty shall be 150% of
the state's average weekly wage multiplied by the highest number of workers employed by the
employer during the period of the employer's noncompliance multiplied by the number of
weeks of the employers noncompliance up to a maximum of 156 weeks during the period of
the employer's noncompliance." [emphasis added]. The fact that these provisions refer to
periods of noncompliance indicate that the intent of the statute is to impose a structure for
penalizing employers who do not maintain continuous workers compensation coverage for its
employees.
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Further evidence of the intent of the statute lies in the designation of where foiids
received from penalty matters are to be deposited. Penalties received foriapsesin coverage are
deposited in the Uninsured Employer's Fund (hereinafter "UEF"). The purpose* of UEF is to
create a fund for the purpose of compensating employees for work-related accidents that may
occur when an employer is uninsured and cannot otherwise compensate the injured person.
U.C.A. §34A-2-211(3)(1997). Such penalties in fact keep UEF viable and are directly tied to the
reason for which UEF is created-to compensate employees for work-related injuries on behalf
of employers who have failed to to maintain workers compensation coverage.
Employer and UEF liability may attach for up to six years according to the Act. See,
U.C.A. §34A-2-417(2)(1997). Potentially, an employee may file a claim for workers
compensation coverage for an injury that occurred during a lapse in coverage six years after the
date of injury. The intent of the statute clearly shows UEF is created to compensate injured
workers from insolvent employers who are uninsured; and that in order to keep the fund viable,
employers who do not maintain workers compensation coverage, are punished in the form of a
monetary fine in order to keep the fund viable. To hold in favor of respondent's contention
would mean UEF may be liable for paying for industrial accidents without any source of income.
As such, it is clear the legislature intended the penalty to accommodate and compensate the fund
for liability for paying out compensation for uninsured employers for those periods of
noncompliance, regardless of whether or not an employer is currently insured.
The very nature of a penalty is to punish. The penalty provisions do not exist merely to
serve as an incentive for employers to gain coverage and therefore absolve themselves of paying
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a penalty. The Workers Compensation Act clearly requires continuous coverage of workers
compensation coverage. To hold otherwise, would render the penalty provisions virtually useless.
An employer could maintain long lapses in coverage until such time as the Division sought to
penalize, and then simply secure coverage and escape any type of penalty. Virtually an employer
can continue operating the business without any reason to comply with the law until they are
caught by the Labor Commission. The employer could then secure coverage, befreefroma
penalty, and yet expose the Uninsured Employer's Fund to liability for the lapse in coverage.
The very fact that the legislature set forth a penalty provision in the statute and a calculation for
determining such penalties based upon periods of noncompliance, evidences the legislature's
intent to punish employers for periods of noncompliance.
This provision must be interpreted in context of the intent of the section as well as in
context of reading of the statute as a whole. Respondent's contention that the Division's ability
to impose a penalty ceases when an employer obtains coverage is without merit.
CLOSING ARGUMENT
The issue in this matter is clear. Respondent was an active Utah employer, maintained
employees, and failed to provide workers compensation benefits for those employees. A penalty
of $1000.00 was imposed for this period of noncompliance.
Respondent stipulated to the fact that they did not have workers compensation coverage
for the period in issue: November 2,1998 to January 12,1999. Further, Respondent stipulated to
the fact that they had employees during this period of time. Based upon a calculation of the
penalty pursuant to 34A-2-21 l(2)(b), Respondent is liable for a penalty of $1,000.00.
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Respondent asserts the Division has no authority to impose a penalty because the
statutory language indicates that such power is discretionary. The Division has exercised its
discretion simply by its act of imposing a penalty in this matter, despite Respondent's argument
that language within the order does not indicate any exercise of discretion. Although the
Division vehemently disagrees with Respondent's arguments in this regard, the fact that the
Division chose to penalize for the time period November 2,1998 to January 12, 1999 instead of
the time period Respondents admits they were without coverage, April 1, 1994 to February 12,
1999, is also an exercise of discretion.
Further, the Division asserts the intent and purpose of Section 34A-2-211 permits the
Division to impose penalties for periods of noncompliance, and that the Division's authority does
not cease merely upon an employer securing coverage. The Division asserts that because the
language of Section 34A-2-21 l(2)(a)(ii) refers specifically to Section 34A-2-201, imposing a
mandatory obligation for an employer to maintain continuous coverage, that provisions within
the same section refer to imposition of a penalty for "periods of noncompliance", and that the
overall purpose of the penalty provisions is to penalize or punish an employer for
noncompliance, not serve merely as an incentive, clearly demonstrates the intent and purpose of
the penalty provisions to serve as a mechanism for punishment for periods of noncompliance. As
such, the Division's ability to impose a penalty does not cease simply because an employer
secures workers compensation coverage. The Workers Compensation Act must be read as a
whole.
Respectfully, the Division requests that the Administrative Law Judge uphold the
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imposition of a $1000.00 penalty in this matter.
Respectfully submitted this ^

day of July, 1999.

SHERYtM. H A / A S H I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the p//

day of July, 1999,1 served a true and correct copy, of the foregoing

Brief of the Industrial Accidents Division & Closing Arguments by personally'delivering the
same to:
LARRIE CARMICHAEL
130 NORTH FAIRFIELD
LAYTON, UT 84041-3926

'JA/1A W.^<KH\
SARA JENSON
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)
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of
ANABASIS INC
130 N Fairfield Rd
Layton UT 84041

)
)

Hon. Don George

)

Case No. 98-10-85827

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Labor Commission claims it may impose a penalty pursuant to Section 34A-2211(2), Utah Code Annotated, notwithstanding plain language to the contrary set forth in this
section. The Labor Commission does not, and can not, dispute the plain language of this section
prohibits a penalty if the employer has insurance at the time the penalty is imposed. Nevertheless,
the Labor Commission claims: The penalty is allowed if the Workers Compensation Act is read as a
whole (Br. p 1.), and "At most, the statutory language is ambiguous." (Br. p 2.) Anabasis replies by
discussing the following points gleaned and marshaled from the Labor Commission's brief:
1. Does the meaning or intend of the Workers Compensation Act when read as
whole allow the Division to impose a penalty when the employer is insured?
2. Is the statutory language ambiguous, therefore requiring statutory interpretation?
3. Do the penalty provisions of § 34a-2-211 indicate an intent to penalize past lapses
in insurance coverage cured at the time the penalty is imposed?
4. What is the purpose of the statute?
5. Do penalty deposits to the Uninsured Employer's Fund have anything to do with
statutory interpretation?
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6. Is the § 34A-2-211 penalty punitive or remedial or both?
7. Are the penalty provisions of $ 24A-2-211 rendered virtually useless by its plain
language?
8. Did the Division exercise discretion in imposing the penalty?
FACTS
1. The effective date of insurance is 2-1-99.
2. The date of Notice of Noncompliance and Intent to Assess Penalty is 2-12-99.
3. The date of Anabasis I n c ' s Answer to Notice of Noncompliance and Intent to
Assess Penalty is 2-16-99, and in which the division was again notified of insurance coverage.
4. The date of the Determination imposing a penalty is 3-3-99.
LAW
"(2)(a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the division may impose a penalty . . . (ii) if
the division believes that an employer of one or more employees |s conducting business without
[workers' compensation insurance], (b) The penalty imposed . . . shall be the greater of: (i) $1,000;"
etc. Emphasis added. Section 34A-2-211(2), Utah Code Annotated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
D O E S T H E M E A N I N G OR I N T E N D O F T H E W O R K E R S COMPENSATION ACT W H E N
R E A D AS A S W H O L E ALLOW T H E DIVISION T O IMPOSE A PENALTY W H E N T H E
E M P L O Y E R IS INSURED?
The Labor Commission claims the plain text of § 34A-2-211(2) "is clearly not within
the meaning or intent of the Workers Compensation Act when read as a whole." (Br. p i . )

Reading

the Act as a whole we find corroboration for Anabasis' position in the following:
34A-2-211. Notice of noncompliance to employer — Enforcement power of division —
Penalty.
(1) (a) In addition to the remedies specified in Section 34A-2-210, if the division has
reason to believe that an employer is conducting business without securing the payment
of benefits in one of the three ways provided in Section 34A-2-201, the division may give
that employer written notice of the noncompliance by certified mail to the last-known
address of the employer.
(b) If the employer does not remedy the default within 15 days after delivery of the
notice, the division may issue an order requiring the employer to appear before the
division and show cause why the employer should not be ordered to comply with Section
34A-2-201.
(c) If it is found that the employer has failed to provide for the payment of benefits in one
REPLY BRIEF
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of the three ways provided in Section 34A-2-201, the division m a y require any
employer to comply with Section 34A-2-201. (Emphasis added.)

p.
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Anabasis submits that the above language indicates the moaning and intent of the Act,

P? read as a whole, includes remedial action without imposing a penalty

The remedial action can be

Q

had any time before the penalty is imposed.

Not imposing a penalty during the two-week notice

KQ period is consistent with the plain language of not imposing a penalty if the employer is insured.
eo Please note the emphasized part of the above statutory language allowing the employer to remedy
the default. Notice to remedy a default is an express statement that the default can be remedied.
Therefore, reading the Act as a whole, express corroboration is found in § 34A-2-211(l)(b) ("remedy
the default") for the specific language in § 34A-2-211(2)(a)(ii) ("is conducting business without")
insurance. Also please note, that the penalty may be imposed only if the business "is conducting
business" without insurance, even if the default is cured after the two-week notice period expires.
The language clearly implies no penalty will be imposed during the two-week period, but there still
must be continuing noncompliance if the penalty is imposed after the two-week period. The above
statement of facts sets forth dates showing compliance within the two-week period.
POINT II
IS T H E STATUTORY L A N G U A G E A M B I G U O U S , THEREFORE REQUIRING STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION?
The Labor Commission claims, "At most, the statutory language is ambiguous. When
interpreting an ambiguous statute" etc.

The Labor Commission proceeds with its interpretation

without explaining what ambiguity exits. (Br. p 2.) The Labor Commission does not quote what
"statutory language is ambiguous." W e do not know which section or what language of the code is
claimed to be ambiguous.

The Labor Commission does not state why the statutory language is

claimed to be ambiguous. The Labor Commission merely proceeds to discuss why the statute should
be interpreted to its liking, without first pointing out what language is ambiguous.

The Labor

^

&
Commission cites cases on how to interpret legislation, but it cites no cases explaining why this

<i>

statute should be interpreted in the first place.

ag

Read alone, § 34A-2-211(2) is not ambiguous.

)j

Reading the whole Workers Compensation Act, § 34A-2-211(2) still is not ambiguous. The act is

<j

not ambiguous in whole or in part.

(U
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insurance and imposing a penalty if a default "in coverage is not cured after notice or before
imposition of a penalty. Counsel can find no argument :R the-Labor Commission's brief pointing to
ambiguities, inconsistencies or contradictions in the act. just arguments supporting its interpretation
of the act as written. The Labor Commission wants § 34A.-2-211 amended from "is conducting
business" to read "was conducting business." The Labor Commission may have its reasons for
wanting the change, but ambiguity is not a valid reason.
POINT III
DO THE PENALTY PROVISIONS OF § 34A-2-211 INDICATE AN INTENT TO PENALIZE
PAST LAPSES IN INSURANCE COVERAGE CURED AT THE TIME THE PENALTY IS
IMPOSED?
The Labor Commission claims, "The language of the accompanying penalty
provisions within Section 34A-2-211 clearly refer in past tense to periods of lapse in coverage." (Br.
p3.) The past-tense quotations in the Labor Commission's brief refer only to how to compute the
penalty, if imposed, not to the authority to impose the penalty. It is not ambiguous to impose no
penalty for a remedied violation and impose a penalty for an un-remedied violation computed by the
amount of time the violation took place.
Section 34A-2-201 requiring continuous insurance does not change the plain meaning
of § 34a-2-211 allowing a penalty if the employer is not insured. The Labor Commission cites no
valid authority for its claim that § 34-2-211 can be interpreted to mean something other than what it
says. Reading the whole Workers Compensation Act does not change the clear meaning of § 34A-2211(2). The Labor Commission cites § 34A-2-201(l)(b) requiring an employer to continuously
maintain insurance, and claims that the combined sections 201 and 211 authorize the penalty.
However, the Labor Commission does not explain how the combined reading does away with

jp

section 201's requirement "that an employer of one or more employees is conducting business

Pi
<D

without [workers' compensation insurance]."

If there is a penalty for failure to continuously

maintain insurance, § 34A-2-211 is not it.

3
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POINT IV
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE?

M

The stated purpose of the statute is:
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"Employers to secure workers' compensation benefits for emplojees . . . (1) Employers .
.. shall secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits Tor tlieir employees: . . .
(b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment 6f this compensation . . . "
§ 34A-2-201(l).

*~cJ

Section 34A-2-211(2) carries out this purpose'without ambiguity or conflict with

Q other provisions by providing:
to

(2)(a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the division may impose a penalty . . . (ii) if the
division believes that an employer of one or more employees |s conducting business
without [workers' compensation insurance]. Emphasis added.
POINT V
DO PENALTY DEPOSITS TO THE UNINSURED EMPLOYER'S FUND HAVE ANYTHING
TO DO WITH STATUTORY INTERPRETATION?
The economic argument about where the penalty money is deposited is irrelevant.
(Br. p 4.) It may be nice to know that the Labor Commission is not dependent on penalties for its
funding, budgeting and appropriations, but that has nothing to do with statutory interpretation. The
pittance generated from fining hapless small businesses hardly would enhance the financial stability
of the Uninsured Employer's Fund. The threat of the penalty might have a salutary effect on
compliance by small businesses. The Labor Commission seems to argue the purpose of the law is
revenue generation instead of compliance.

The clear wording of § 34A-2-211(2)(a) would

accomplish purposes of revenue generation and compliance. There is no reason to suspect obtaining
compliance at the expense of revenue generation is contrary to legislative purpose.
POINT VI
IS THE § 34A-2-211 PENALTY PUNITIVE OR REMEDIAL OR BOTH?
The Labor Commission emphasis the punitive and revenue generating aspects of §
34A-2-211 in its brief. Section 34A-2-211(2) is both remedial and punitive. The statute is hard on
employers who do not remedy violations, and lenient for those who do remedy violations. There is
nothing ambiguous or inconsistent with this. The legislature makes policy, the Labor Commission
carries it out. The legislative policy is clearly remedial, as well as punitive and revenue generating.

^
[?
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POINT VII
ARE THE PENALTY PROVISIONS OF § 34A-2-211 RENDERED VIRTUALLY USELESS BY
ITS PLAIN LANGUAGE?
"The penalty provisions do not exist merely to serve as an incentive for employers to
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gain coverage and therefore absolve themselves-of ravins *a canaltv." (Br. p 4.) The penalty
provision is a useful tool for generating compliance and needs no additional purpose to justify its
existence. Revenue generating and penal statutes are ncSt the-6nly statutes that are useful. The Labor
Commission may consider "the penalty provisions virtuaUy ureless" (Br. p 5.) to itself because they
do not produce what it considers enough revenue, but that does not make them useless.
The Labor Commission claims, 'The very nature of a penalty is to punish." (Br. p 4.)
It is also the nature of a penalty to deter and remedy. Section 34A-2-21 l(2)(a) deters, remedies, and
punishes those who are not deterred and who do not remedy violations. There is nothing ambiguous
about this useful law. The Labor Commission claims employers can ignore the law with impunity
until caught by merely obtaining insurance under the plain language of § 34A-2-21 l(2)(a). (Br. p 5.)
That is not true. The Workers Compensation Act is ignored at great risk and peril.
POINT VIII
DID THE DIVISION EXERCISE DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY?
At the hearing the administrative law judge stated there appears to be some evidence
that the Labor Commission exercised discretion in deciding to impose a penalty. That finding should
be reconsidered in light of the Labor Commission's assertion to the contrary in its brief. "The
Division has exercised its discretion simply by its act of imposing a penalty in this matter . . .
Although the Division vehemently disagrees with Respondent's arguments in this regard, the fact
that the Division chose to penalize for [a specific time period] is also an exercise of discretion." (Br.
p 6.) That is not an exercise of administrative discretion. That is a "vehement" statement of policy
not to exercise discretion. The Labor Commission's "vehement" statement of policy reasonably
leads counsel to assume it has never exercised, and will never exercise, its discretion to not penalize,
or to reduce the penalty, in appropriate circumstances calling for the sound exercise of administrative
discretion as required by the statute. Anabasis submits that a finding the Labor Commission
exercised its discretion cannot be reasonably made in light of the Labor Commission's "vehement"
statement of policy to the contrary.
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On appeal Anabasis seeks a reasonable exercise of discretion on findings and penalty.
Anabasis submits that a $1,000.00 penalty is net rea?on?ble nor mandatory in this matter. A
reasonable exercise of discretion is authorized by § 34A-2-211(2)(a). A reasonable finding of fact
and conclusion of law would be substantial compliauce with law on the part of Anabasis. A
reasonable penalty would be no penalty.
CONCLUSION
The Labor Commission correctly observes, 'The Workers Compensation Act must be
read as a whole." (Br. p 6.) Read in whole, in part, and in plain English, Anabasis is in compliance
and the Labor Commission is not.
The Section 34A-2-211(2)(a) penalty is an additional penalty which may be imposed
only when the employer is in violation at the time the penalty is imposed, "notwithstanding" other
penalties which may be imposed and other remedies which may be pursued. The $1,000 penalty
cannot be imposed on Anabasis Inc because it was in compliance when the penalty was imposed.
DATED: August 13,1999.
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL
Attorney for Anabasis Inc
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This certifies that the undersigned mailed the foregoing Reply Brief Of Anabasis to
the following this 13th day of August 1999.
Hon. Don George
Administrative Law Judge
LABOR COMMISSION
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
PO Box 146612
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6612
SHERYLM. HAYASKI
Attorney for Industrial Accidents Division
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
PO Box 146600
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6600

R&E A. CARMICHAEL
Attorney for Anabasis Inc
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Utah Labor Commission
Adjudication Division
Case No. 1981085827
IN THE MATTER OF NONCOMPLIANCE:

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

ANABASIS INC

HEARING:

BEFORE:

APPEARANCES:

July 7,1999 at 10 a.m.
Labor Commission of Utah
Hearing Room 336
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
Anabasis,Inc. (Anabasis or petitioner) is represented by attorney
Larrie Carmichael.
The Industrial Accidents Division (the Division) of the Labor
Commission is represented by attorney Sheryl Hayashi.

At the hearing, no testimony was taken, and only documentary evidence was
received. Having reviewed the file, the evidence and written arguments, the ALJ finds
and concludes as follows:
Anabasis, Inc. is a Utah corporation operating a beauty salon at 1300 North
Fairfield Road, Layton, Utah. It is undisputed that Anabasis had employees during the
period in question from November 2, 1998 through January 12,1999, but did not have
workers compensation insurance in force during that period. It is also undisputed that
Anabasis did not have during that period nor has it ever had a compensable industrial
accident or occupational disease claim during its operation.
Anabasis obtained workers comp insurance coverage, effective February 1,
1999.
Subsequently, on February 12,1999 the Industrial Accidents Division issued a
Notice of Noncompliance and Intent to Assess Penalty. Anabasis timely answered that
notice on February 16, 1999. On March 3, 1999, the Division issued a Determination
and Order Declaring Noncompliance and Assessing a Penalty (in the statutory
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minimum alternative amount of $1,000), which Determination and Order was
appealable within the succeeding 30 days.
Anabasis timely filed an appeal and argues on the following grounds:
1.
U.C.A. Section 32A-2-211 (b) should be interpreted so that obtaining
workers compensation coverage within 15 days of the Notice of Noncompliance and
Intent to Assess Penalty (or as here, before the 15 day period even begins), is a bar to
the imposition of any penalty under Section 34A-2-211 (2)(b).
2.
asking for a reasonable exercise of discretion on findings (such as
substantial compliance with the law on the part of Anabasis) and no penalty (Anabasis
deeming a $1000 penalty as excessive and unconscionable in this matter).
The applicable statutory sections are:
34A-2-211. Notice of noncompliance to employer Enforcement power of division -Penalty.
(1) (a) In addition to the remedies specified in Section
34A-2-210, if the division has reason to believe that an
employer is conducting business without securing the
payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in
Section 34A-2-201, the division may give that employer
written notice of the noncompliance by certified mail to the
last-known address of the employer.
(b) If the employer does not remedy the default within
15 days after delivery of the notice, the division may issue
an order requiring the employer to appear before the division
and show cause why the employer should not be ordered to
comply with Section 34A-2-201.
(c) If it is found that the employer has failed to provide
for the payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided
in Section 34A-3-201, the division may require any employer
to comply with Section 34A-2-201.
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(2) (a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the division
may impose a penalty against the employer under this
Subsection (2):
(i) subject to the notice and other requirements of
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act; and
(ii) if the division believes that an employer of one or
more employees is conducting business without securing the
payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in
Section 34A-2-201.
(b) The penalty imposed under Subsection (2)(a) shall
be the greater of:
(i) $1,000; or
(ii) three times the amount of the premium the
employer would have paid for workers' compensation
insurance based on the rate riling of the Workers1
Compensation Fund of Utah during the period of
noncompliance.
When subsections (1) (a) through (c) are read in sequence, it is clear that if the
Industrial Accidents Division has a reasonable belief that an employer is uninsured, it
may require by certified mail notice that the employer prove within 15 days that it has
workers compensation coverage, or if the employer fails to show cause why coverage is
unnecessary, an order requiring compliance [i.e., requiring the employer to obtain
insurance] will issue. Such an order can be a prelude to a civil action against the
employer under Section 34A-2-210, or criminal actions under Section 34A-2-209 or
Section 34A-2-802. If, as in this case, the employer responds with timely proof that it
has coverage, no order would issue. To that extent, Anabasis is correct that it was not
in violation from February 1,1999 on, and therefore no further order could issue
requiring it to obtain insurance.
Arriving at that conclusion does not preclude application of 34A-2-211(2) as
Subsection (b) thereof clearly states that the Division may impose a penalty
notwithstanding Subsection (1)» in an amount three times the premium during the
period of noncompliance (emphasis added). It follows logically that if the opening
statement in Section 2 (a) disallows section 1, it does so in its entirety, not piecemeal.
Therefore, discussion of the 15 day period in Section 1 is irrelevant, as is Anabasis'
focus on the date of compliance. The penalty is imposed for the period when Anabasis
had employees but did not have coverage. That period is not disputed as being from
November 2, 1998 through January 12,1999.
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Anabasis second contention is that the Division has not exercised discretion
because it chose to impose a penalty (as the statute allows), and because the penalty
was for $1,000. The choice to impose a penalty or not, is in fact a discretionary act.
The amount of the penalty is not a discretionary act as it is mandated by Section
34A-2-211 (2) (b) to be the greater of $1,000 or three times the premium for the period
of noncompliance. The Division followed that statutory mandate and properly imposed
the $1,000 penalty. Anabasis has not provided any case law that would allow the
Division, the Administrative Law Judge, or the Labor Commission to impose, reduce, or
suspend that $1,000 penalty. Accordingly, the penalty should be affirmed.

ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Industrial Accidents Division's March 3,
1999 Determination and Order Declaring Noncompliance and Assessing a Penalty,
dated, against Anabasis, Inc., is hereby affirmed in its entirety.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by this decision may file a Motion for Review with the
Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set
forth the specific basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30
days from the date the decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their
Responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of the date of the Motion for
Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission
conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for
Review or its Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the
Appeals Board, the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.
DATED this 14th day of April, 2000.
UTAH1-ABOR COMMISSION

^e.
Donald L. George
Administrative Law Judge
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I hereby certify that on the 14th day of April, 2000 I mailed a copy of the
attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, postage prepaid to the
following:
ANABASIS INC
1300 NO FAIRFIELD RD
LAYTON UT 84041
LARRIE CARMICHAEL ESQ
130 NO FAIRFIELD
LAYTON UT 84040
JOYCE SEWELL DIRECTOR
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS DIVISION
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
(interoffice)
SHERYL HAYASHI ESQ
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
(interoffice)
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LORETTA WOODMANSEE
SUPPORT SPECIALIST
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LARRIEA. CARMICHAEL (580)
Attorney for Anabasis Inc
130 North Fairfield
Layton UT 84041-3926
(801) 546-9888
STATE OF UTAH
LABOR COMMISSION
DIVISION OF ADJUDICATION
APPEALS BOARD
160 East 300 South,
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6615
In the Matter of Noncompliance

)

of

)

ANABASIS INC

)

MOTION FOR REVIEW
Case No. 98-10-85827

Anabasis Inc appeals and moves review of the decision of the administrative law
judge, Donald L. George, set forth in the Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, and Order dated
April 14,2000.
Anabasis requests the appeal be heard by the Appeals Board.
This appeal is made pursuant to Sections 34A-1-303, 63-46b-12, Utah Code
Annotated, and Rule R602-2-1 M of the Utah Administrative Code.
Anabasis was substantially prejudiced by the following errors:
1. The administrative law judge did not properly interpret and apply the law. The
applicable law, cited by the administrative law judge, is "Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the
division may impose a penalty . . . (ii) if the division believes that an employer or one or more
employees is conducting business without securing [workers' compensation insurance], (b) The
penalty imposed . . . shall be the greater of: (i) $1,000;" etc. Emphasis added. § 34A-2-211(2).
2. The administrative law judge did not make a finding of fact or conclusion of law
that the Division exercised discretion in imposing the $1,000 penalty. Other findings of fact are not
disputed. The administrative law judge decided all of the issues requiring resolution, but the penalty
part of the order is not supported by findings.
The grounds for review are:
1. The Administrative law judge incorrectly interpreted the statute's plain language,
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and has no authority to interpret the statute. The administrative law judge erred in corchdin^ ?s a
matter of law that the Division may impose a penalty when the employer is in compliance if the
employer was not in past compliance. The error is ignoring the words "is con|ductink business
without securing" workers compensation. The language of the statute does not alloto*imposition of a
penalty for a past period of noncompliance of an employer in compliance at the time the penalty is
imposed. To do so is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. The plain wording of the
statute is not ambiguous. Therefore, interpreting the statute is not proper. The division has no
express or implied authority to interpret unambiguous statutory language. Reading the statute as a
whole does not make the statutory language ambiguous.

There is only one reasonable and

permissible reading of the words "is conducting business." The administrative law judge is correct
in stating "discussion of the 15 day period in Section 1 [§ 34A-2-211(1)] is irrelevant," but is in error
in saying "as is Anabasis' focus on the date of compliance." The words "is conducting business"
also appear in § 34A-2-211(2)(a)(ii), and is the actual focus of Anabasis' argument.
2. The administrative law judge erred in not making a finding of fact or conclusion
of law that the Division exercised discretion. The findings of fact and conclusions of law are not
adequate to support the penalty part of the order. The conclusion that 'The choice to impose a
penalty or not, is in fact a discretionary act" is an interpretation of the statute. It is not a finding of
fact that the Division did an act amounting to such exercise, nor is it a conclusion of law that
discretion was exercised by such act. A finding of fact or conclusion of law that the Division
properly exercised discretion cannot be made because the Division never has and never will exercise
discretion, its policy being stated in its Brief dated July 26, 1999: 'The Division has exercised its
discretion simply by its act of imposing a penalty in this matter . . . Although the Division
0* vehemently disagrees with Respondent's arguments in this regard, the fact that the Division chose to
(D

2 penalize for [a specific time period] is also an exercise of discretion." (Br. p. 6.) Always imposing
D the maximum penalty all the time is an exercise of policy not an exercise of discretion, and is
r> contrary to law. The division may not refuse to exercise discretion under the statute. There are
facts in the record justifying an exercise of discretion.

Anabasis reasonably believed it had

en
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g, purchased full business insurance coverage and was unaware of this gap in coverage until notified by
&

»3 the division. The administrative law judge found that no workers compensation claim has'ever been
5 made against Anabasis. The Labor Commission makes the dubious argument that the purpose of the
^

law is to generate revenue in its Brief dated July 26, 1999, page 4

Any claim the Qivision ever

\Q

* •*

•

® exercises discretion should be viewed with enormous skepticism. The administrative law judge is in
U)

^o error in stating "Anabasis has not provided any case law that would allow the Division, the
Administrative Law Judge, or the Labor Commission to impose, reduce, or suspend that $1,000
penalty." Anabasis did not cite case law because it cited statutory law, specifically "the division may
impose a penalty" at § 34A-2-211(2)(a). Case law is not necessary to understand the word "may"
means discretionary.
DATED: May 5,2000.
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL
Attorney for Anabasis Inc
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This certifies that the undersigned mailed the foregoing Motion For Review to the
following this 5th day of 2000.
Labor Commission
Division Of Adjudication
Appeals Board
160 East 300 South
PO Box 146610
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6615
Donald L. George
Administrative Law Judge, Presiding Officer
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6615
SHERYL M. HAYASKI
Attorney for Uninsured Employers' Fund
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
PO Box 146600
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6600
ANABASIS INC
130 North Fairfield
LaytonUT 84041
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APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

In the matter of:
noncompliance of

*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

ANABASIS INC,
*

Case No. 1981085827

*
*

Anabasis Inc. asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review the
Administrative Law Judge's assessment of penalty against Anabasis pursuant to §34A-2-211(2)
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act").
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah*
Code Ann. §§63-46b-12, 34A-2-211(4)(c), and 34A-2-801(3).

BACKGROUND
Section 34A-2-201 of the Act requires Utah employers to maintain workers' compensation
coverage. Under §34A-2-211(2) of the Act, the Commission's Industrial Accidents Division may
penalize employers doing business without such coverage. Pursuant to these provisions of the
Act, the Division assessed a penalty of $1,000 against Anabasis for the period of its
noncompliance. Anabasis appealed the penalty to the Commission's Adjudication Division, which
affirmed the penalty. Anabasis then sought Appeals Board review of the ALJ's decision.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Anabasis contends it is not subject to penalty under §34A-2-211(2) because it obtained
coverage before the penalty was actually imposed. Anabasis also contends the ALJ's decision
lacks adequate findings to support imposition of the penalty.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties submitted this matter for decision based on the documentary evidence
contained in the file The documentary evidence establishes that Anabasis, a corporation, does
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business under the name of "John's Salon." The salon has been in business for several years1 and
has had employees during that time.
During October 1998 the Division received information that Anabasis had no workers'
compensation coverage. After investigation, the Division concluded the allegation was correct.
On February 12, 1999, the Division notified Anabasis that it intended to assess a noncompliance
penalty of $1,000, the minimum penalty provided in §34A-2-411(2), against Anabasis for its
failure to maintain coverage for the period of November 2, 1998, to January 12, 1999. Anabasis
then obtained a policy of workers' compensation insurance with coverage backdated to February
1, 1999. On March 3, 1999, the Division imposed the $1,000 noncompliance penalty against
Anabasis.2
Although Anabasis has been an employer for six years, it has never previously obtained
workers' compensation coverage Anabasis's employees have not incurred any work- related
injuries
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Section 34A-2-201 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act imposes the following
obligation on Utah employers (emphasis added):
An employer shall secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for its
employees by.
(1) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with the
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah;
(2) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with any
stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of
workers' compensation insurance in this state; or
(3) obtaining approval from the division in accordance with Section 34A-2-201.5
to pay direct compensation . . . .

1

Department of Workforce Services records indicate the salon became active as a Utah
employer in 1994 and has employed from two to six employees each calendar quarter since then.
2

The Division chose to commence the penalty period on November 2, 1998, even though
Anabasis had failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance for several years prior to that
date Had Anabasis purchased insurance for all prior years at even the minimum available
premium, its cost would have exceeded $1,800.
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Those employers who violate §34A-2-201 by failing to maintain workers' compensation
coverage are subject to the penalty authorized by §34A-2-211(2) of the Act:
Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the division may impose a penalty against the
employer under this Subsection (2):
(i) subject to the notice and other requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act; and
(ii) if the division believes that an employer of one or more employees is
conducting business without securing the payment of benefits in one of the three
ways provided in Section 34A-2-201.
(b) The penalty imposed under Subsection (2)(a) shall be the greater of:
(i) $1,000; or
(ii) three times the amount of the premium the employer would have paid for
workers' compensation insurance based on the rate filing of the Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah during the period of noncompliance.
(c) For purposes of Subsection (2)(b)(ii), the premium is calculated by applying
rates and rate multipliers to the payroll basis undeY Subsection (2)(d), using the
highest rated employee class code applicable to the employer's operations.
(d) The payroll basis for the purpose of calculating the premium penalty shall be
150% of the state's average weekly wage multiplied by the highest number of
workers employed by the employer during the period of the employer's
noncompliance multiplied by the number of weeks of the employer's
noncompliance up to a maximum of 156 weeks.
While the imposition of penalty is discretionary with the Industrial Accidents Division, the
amount of penalty is fixed by the foregoing statute and cannot be altered.
In challenging the noncompliance penalty imposed against it, Anabasis does not deny that
it had employees during the period in question, nor does it claim to be exempt from the Act's
coverage requirements or that it complied with those coverage requirements. Instead, Anabasis
argues no penalty can be imposed because it obtained coverage prior to the date the Division
actually assessed the penalty. In other words, Anabasis argues that the statutory penalty can be
imposed only for continuing lapses of coverage. The entire justification for Anabasis's argument
is found in §34A-2-21 l(2)(a)(ii), authorizing the Division to impose a penalty "if the Division
believes that an employer... is conducting business" without coverage. (Emphasis added.)
In considering Anabasis's argument, it is appropriate to read §34 A-2-211 (2) in its entirety,
rather than focus on a single passage out of context. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Cathco
v Valentine Crane Brunies Onvon Architect 944 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah 1997): "It is well
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established that a statute should be read as a whole." Similarly, in Andrus v. Allred. 17 Utah 2d
106, 109 (Utah 1965) the Court stated:
(O)ne of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is that the statute should
be looked at as a whole and in the light of the general purpose it was intended to
serve; and should be so interpreted and applied as to accomplish that objective.
(Footnote omitted.) In order to give the statute the implementation which will
fulfill its purpose, reason and intention sometimes prevail over technically applied
literalness.
The language of §34A-2-211(2), when read as a whole and in light of its intended purpose,
indicates its operation is not confined only to continuing violations, but also applies to instances
of past violations. For example, various subsections of §34A-2-211(2) refer to "the period of
noncompliance," which suggests circumstances where the beginning date and ending date of the
employer's noncompliance is known. The Appeals Board therefore concludes that §34A-2-211 (2)
permits penalties against employers who have failed to maintain coverage, whether or not the
employer has later obtained coverage.
Anabasis also argues that an inadequate factual basis exists to support the Division's
exercise of discretion in penalizing Anabasis. The Appeals Board finds no merit to this argument.
To the contrary, the basis for the Division's imposition of penalty against Anabasis has been set
forth in the orders of the Division and the ALJ, as well as in this decision. Furthermore, Anabasis
does not challenge any of the facts on which the penalty is based. Under these circumstances,
there has been no abuse of discretion in the imposition of penalty against Anabasis pursuant to
§34A-2-211(2).
In summary, the Appeals Board concludes that under the admitted facts of this case, §34A2-211(2) of the Act authorizes imposition of a $1,000 penalty against Anabasis.
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ORDER
The Appeals Board affirms the decision of the ALJ and denies Anabasis's motion for review.
It is so ordered
Dated this £

day of August, 2000

Patricia S. Drawe

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of
Anabasis, Inc., Case No. 1981085827, was mailed first class postage prepaid this jg^day of
August, 2000, to the following:
ANABASIS INC.
130 NORTH FAIRFIELD
LAYTONUT 84041
SHERYL M. HAYASHI, ATTORNEY
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
P O BOX 146600
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL, ATTORNEY
130 NORTH FAIRFIELD
LAYTONUT 84041-3926

Sara Jensen
SupporLSpecialist
Utah Labor Commission
Orders\1981085827
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Utah Code Annotated
34A-1 -303
Review of administrative decision.
(1) A decision entered by an administrative law judge under this title
is the final order of the commission unless a further appeal is initiated under
this title and in accordance with the rules of the commission governing the
review.
(2) (a) Unless otherwise provided, a person who is entitled to appeal
a decision of an administrative law judge under this title, may appeal the
decision by filing a motion for review with the Division of Adjudication.
(b) Unless a party in interest to the appeal requests in accordance
with Subsection (3) that the appeal be heard by the Appeals Board, the
commissioner shall hear the review in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act. A decision of the commissioner is a final order
of the commission unless set aside by the court of appeals.
(c) (i) If in accordance with Subsection (3) a party in interest to the
appeal requests that the appeal be heard by the Appeals Board, the Appeals
Board shall hear the review in accordance with:
(A) Section 34A-1-205; and
(B) Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(ii) A decision of the Appeals Board is a final order of the commission
unless set aside by the court of appeals.
(3) A party in interest may request that an appeal be heard by the
Appeals Board by filing the request with the Division of Adjudication:
(a) as part of the motion for review; or
(b) if requested by a party in interest who did not file a motion for
review, within 20 days of the date the motion for review is filed with the
Division of Adjudication.
(4) (a) On appeal, the commissioner or the Appeals Board may:
(i) affirm the decision of an administrative law judge;
(ii) modify the decision of an administrative law judge;
(iii) return the case to an administrative law judge for further action as
directed; or
(iv) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of an
administrative law judge.
(b) The commissioner or Appeals Board may not conduct a trial de
novo of the case.
(c) The commissioner or Appeals Board may base its decision on:
(i) the evidence previously submitted in the case; or
(ii) on written argument or written supplemental evidence requested
by the commissioner or Appeals Board.
(d) The commissioner or Appeals Board may permit the parties to:
(i) file briefs or other papers; or
(ii) conduct oral argument.
(e) The commissioner or Appeals Board shall promptly notify the
parties to any proceedings before it of its decision, including its findings and
conclusions.
(5) (a) A member of the Appeals Board may not participate in any
case in which the member is an interested party. Each decision of a member of
the Appeals Board shall represent the member's independent judgment.
(b) If a member of the Appeals Board may not participate in a case
because the member is an interested party, the two members of the Appeals
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Board that may hear the case shall assign an individual to participate as a
member of the board in that case if the individual:
(i) is not a interested party in the case; and
(ii) was not previously assigned to preside over any proceeding or
take any administrative action related to the case.
(6) If an order is appealed to the court of appeals after the party
appealing the order has exhausted all administrative appeals, the court of
appeals has jurisdiction to:
(a) review, reverse, remand, or annul any order of the commissioner or
Appeals Board; or
(b) suspend or delay the operation or execution of the order of the
commissioner or Appeals Board being appealed.
Enacted by Chapter 375, 1997 General Session.
34A-2-210
Power to bring suit for noncompliance.
(1) (a) The commission or the division on behalf of the commission
may maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin any employer, within
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, from further
operation of the employer's business, when the employer fails to provide for
the payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in Section 34A-2201.
(b) Upon a showing of failure to provide for the payment of benefits,
the court shall enjoin the further operation of the employer's business until the
payment of these benefits has been secured by the employer as required by
Section 34A-2-201. The court may enjoin the employer without requiring
bond from the commission or division.
(2) If the division has reason to believe that an employer is
conducting a business without securing the payment of compensation in one
of the three ways provided in Section 34A-2-201, the division may give the
employer five aays written notice by registered mail of the noncompliance
and if the employer within the five days written notice does not remedy the
default:
(a) the commission or the division on behalf of the commission may
file suit under Subsection (1); and
(b) the court may, ex parte, issue without bond a temporary
injunction restraining the further operation of the employer's business.
Enacted by Chapter 375, 1997 General Session
34A-2-211
Notice of noncompliance to employer - Enforcement power
of division — Penalty.
(1) (a) In addition to the remedies specified in Section 34A-2-21G, if
the division has reason to believe that an employer is conducting business
without securing the payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided
in Section 34A-2-201, the division may give that employer written notice of
the noncompliance by certified mail to the last-known address of the
employer.
(b) If the employer does not remedy the default within 15 days after
delivery of the notice, the division may issue an order requiring the employer
to appear before the division and show cause why the employer should not
be ordered to comply with Section 34A-2-201.
c) If it is found that the employer has failed to provide for the
payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in Section 34A-2-201,
the division may require any employer to comply with Section 34A-2-201.
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(2) (a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the division may impose a
penalty against the employer under this Subsection (2):
(I) subject to the notice and other requirements of Title 63, Chapter
46b, Administrative Procedures Act; and
(ii) if the division believes that an employer of one or more employees
is conducting business without securing the payment of benefits in one of the
three ways provided in Section 34A-2-201.
(b) The penalty imposed under Subsection (2)(a) shall be the greater
of:
(i) $1,000; or
(ii) three times the amount of the premium the employer would have
paid for workers' compensation insurance based on the rate filing of the
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah during the period of noncompliance.
(c) For purposes of Subsection (2)(b)(ii), the premium is calculated by
applying rates and rate multipliers to the payroll basis under Subsection (2)(d),
using the highest rated employee class code applicable to the employer's
operations.
(d) The payroll basis for the purpose of calculating the premium
penalty shall be 150% of the state's average weekly wage multiplied by the
highest number of workers employed by the employer during the period of
the employer's noncompliance multiplied by the number of weeks of the
employer's noncompliance up to a maximum of 156 weeks.
(3) The penalty imposed under Subsection (2) shall be deposited in
the Uninsured Employers' Fund created by Section 34A-2-704 and used for
the purposes of that fund.
(4) (a) An employer who disputes the determination, imposition, or
amount of a penalty imposed under Subsection (2) shall request a hearing
before an administrative law judge within 30 days of the date of issuance of
the administrative action imposing the penalty or the administrative action
becomes a final order of the commission.
(b) The employer's request for a hearing under Subsection (4)(a) shall
specify the facts and grounds that are the basis of the employer's objection to
the determination, imposition, or amount of the penalty.
(c) An administrative law judge's decision under this Subsection (4)
may be reviewed pursuant to Part 8, Adjudication.
(5) (a) After a penalty has been issued and becomes a final order of
the commission the division on behalf of the commission may file an abstract
for any uncollected penalty in the district court.
(b) The abstract filed under Subsection (5)(a) shall state:
(i) the amount of the uncollected penalty;
(ii) reasonable attorneys' fees;
(iii) costs of collection; and
(iv) court costs.
(c) The filed abstract shall have the effect of a judgment of that court.
(6) Any administrative action issued by the division under this
section shall:
(a) be in writing;
(b) be sent by certified mail to the last-known address of the
employer;
(c) state the findings and administrative action of the division; and
(d) specify its effective date, which may be immediate or may be at a
later date.
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(7) The final order of the commission under this section, upon
application by the division on behalf of the commission made on or after the
effective date of the order to a court of general jurisdiction in any county in
this state, may be enforced by an order to comply entered ex parte and
without notice by the court.
Amended by Chapter 13, 1998 General Session
34A-2-417
Claims and benefits - Time limits for filing — Burden of proof
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability
cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if for a period of three
consecutive years the employee does not:
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial
accident; and
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer
or insurance carrier for payment.
(2) (a) A claim described in Subsection (2)(b) is barred, unless the
employee:
(i) files an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication
no later than six years from the date of the accident; and
(ii) by no later than 12 years from the date of the accident, is able to
meet the employee's burden of proving that the employee is due the
compensation claimed under this chapter.
(b) Subsection (2)(a) applies to a claim for compensation for:
(i) temporary total disability benefits;
(ii) temporary partial disability benefits;
(iii) permanent partial disability benefits; or
(iv) permanent total disability benefits.
(c) The commission may enter an order awarding or denying an
employee's claim for compensation under this chapter within a reasonable
time period beyond 12 years from the date of the accident, if:
(i) the employee complies with Subsections (2)(a)(i) and (ii); and
(ii) 12 years from the date of the accident:
(A) (I) the employee is fully cooperating in a commission approved
reemployment plan; and
(II) the results of that commission approved reemployment plan are
not known; or
(B) the employee is actively adjudicating issues of compensability
before the commission.
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application for
hearing is filed within one year of the date of death of the employee.
(4) (a) (i) Subject to Subsections (2)(c) and (4)(b), after an employee
files an application for hearing within six years from the date of the accident,
the Division of Adjudication may enter an order to show cause why the
employee's claim should not be dismissed because the employee has failed to
meet the employee's burden of proof to establish an entitlement to
compensation claimed in the application for hearing.
(ii) The order described in Subsection (4)(a)(i) may be entered on the
motion of the:
(A) Division of Adjudication;
(B) employee's employer; or
(C) employer's insurance carrier.
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a), the Division of Adjudication may dismiss
a claim:
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(i) without prejudice; or
(ii) with prejudice only if:
(A) the Division of Adjudication adjudicates the merits of the
employee's entitlement to the compensation claimed in the application for
hearing; or
(B) the employee fails to comply with Subsection (2)(a)(ii).
(c) If a claim is dismissed without prejudice under Subsection (4)(b),
the employee is subject to the time limits under Subsection (2)(a) to claim
compensation under this chapter.
Amended by Chapter 261, 1999 General Session
34A-2-704
Uninsured Employers1 Fund.
(1) (a) There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund. The Uninsured
Employers' Fund has the purpose of assisting in the payment of workers'
compensation benefits to any person entitled to the benefits, if:
(i) that person's employer:
(A) is individually, jointly, or severally liable to pay the benefits; and
(B) (I) becomes or is insolvent;
(II) appoints or has appointed a receiver; or
(III) otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or
other security to cover workers' compensation liabilities; and
(ii) the employment relationship between that person and the
person's employer is localized within the state as provided in Subsection (20).
(b) The Uninsured Employers' Fund succeeds to all monies previously
held in the Default Indemnity Fund.
(c) If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the Uninsured Employers'
Fund is liable for all obligations of the employer as set forth in this chapter
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, with the exception of
penalties on those obligations.
(2) (a) Monies for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be deposited
into the Uninsured Employers' Fund in accordance with Subsection 59-9101(2).
(b) The commissioner shall appoint an administrator of the Uninsured
Employers' Fund.
(c) The state treasurer is the custodian of the Uninsured Employers'
Fund, and the administrator shall make provisions for and direct its
distribution.
(3) Reasonable costs of administering the Uninsured Employers'
Fund or other fees required to be paid by the Uninsured Employers' Fund may
be paid from the Uninsured Employers' Fund.
(4) The state treasurer snail:
(a) receive workers' compensation premium assessments from the
State Tax Commission; and
(b) invest the Uninsured Employers' Fund to ensure maximum
investment return for both long and short term investments in accordance
with Section 51-7-12.5.
(5) (a) The administrator may employ, retain, or appoint counsel to
represent the Uninsured Employers' Fund in all proceedings brought to
enforce claims against or on behalf of the Uninsured Employers' Fund.
(b) If requested by the commission, the following shall aid in the
representation of the Uninsured Employers' Fund:
(i) the attorney general; or
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(ii) the city attorney, or county attorney of the locality in which:
(A) any investigation, hearing, or trial under this chapter or Chapter 3,
Utah Occupational Disease Act, is pending;
(B) the employee resides; or
(C) an employer:
(I) resides; or
(II) is doing business.
(6) To the extent of the compensation and other benefits paid or
payable to or on behalf of an employee or the employee's dependents from
the Uninsured Employers' Funa, the Uninsured Employers' Fund, by
subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and benefits of the employfee or the
employee's dependents against the employer failing to make the
compensation payments.
(7) (a) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an
insolvent employer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the
Uninsured Employers' Fund.
(b) The court with jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under
this section a priority equal to that to which the claimant would have been
entitled in the absence of this section against the assets of the insolvent
employer.
(c) The expenses of the Uninsured Employers' Fund in handling
claims shall be accorded the same priority as the liquidator's expenses.
(8) (a) The administrator shall periodically file with the receiver,
trustee, or liquidator of the insolvent employer or insurance carrier:
(i) statements of the covered claims paid by the Uninsured Employers'
Fund; and
(ii) estimates of anticipated claims against the Uninsured Employers'
Fund.
(b) The filings under Subsection (8)(a) shall preserve the rights of the
Uninsured Employers' Fund for claims against the assets of the insolvent
employer.
(9) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable
from the Uninsured Employers' Fund has been caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another person not in the same employment, the Uninsured
Employers' Fund has the same rights as allowed under Section 34A-2-106.
(10) The Uninsured Employers' Fund, subject to approval of the
administrator, shall discharge its obligations by:
(a) adjusting its own claims; or
(b) contracting with an adjusting company, risk management
company, insurance company, or other company that has expertise and
capabilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensation claims.
(11) (a) For the purpose of maintaining the Uninsured Employers'
Fund, an administrative law judge, upon rendering a decision with respect to
any claim for workers' compensation benefits in which an uninsured employer
was duly joined as a party, shall:
(l) order the uninsured employer to reimburse the Uninsured
Employers' Fund for all benefits paid to or on behalf of an injured employee
by the Uninsured Employers' Fund along with interest, costs, and attorneys'
fees; and
(ii) impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 15% of the
value of the total award in connection with the claim tnat shall be paid into
the Uninsured Employers' Fund.
(b) Awards may be docketed as other awards under this chapter and
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Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(12) The liability of the state, the commission, and the state treasurer,
with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees, or
disbursement properly chargeable against the Uninsured Employers' Fund, is
limited to the assets in the Uninsured Employers' Fund, and they are not
otherwise in any way liable for the making of any payment.
(13) The commission may make reasonable rules for the processing
and payment of claims for compensation from the Uninsured Employers'
Fund.
(14) (a) If it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Employers' Fund to
pay benefits under this section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured,
employer, the Uninsured Employers' Fund may assess all other self-insured
employers amounts necessary to pay:
(i) the obligations of the Uninsured Employers' Fund subsequent to
an insolvency;
(ii) the expenses of handling covered claims subsequent to an
insolvency;
(iii) the cost of examinations under Subsection (15); and
(iv) other expenses authorized by this section.
(b) The assessments of each self-insured employer shall be in the
proportion that the manual premium of the self-insured employer for the
preceding calendar year bears to the manual premium of all self-insured
employers for the preceding calendar year.
(c) Each self-insured employer shall be notified of the employer's
assessment not later than 30 days before the assessment is due.
(d) (i) A self-insured employer may not be assessed in any year an
amount greater than 2% of that selt-insurea employer's manual premium for
the preceding calendar year.
(ii) u the maximum assessment does not provide in any one year an
amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from tne Uninsured
Employers' Fund for one or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid
portion shall be paid as soon as funds become available.
(e) All self-insured employers are liable under this section for a period
not to exceed three years after the self-insured employer's voluntary or
involuntary termination of self-insurance privileges within this state.
(f) This Subsection (14) does not apply to claims made against an
insolvent self-insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior to July 1,
1986.
(15) (a) A self-insured employer shall notify the division of any
information indicating that any self-insured employer may be insolvent or in a
financial condition hazardous to its employees or the public.
(b) Upon receipt of the notification described in Subsection (15)(a)
and with gooa cause appearing, the division may order an examination of that
self-insured employer.
(c) The cost of the examination ordered under Subsection (15)(b)
shall be assessed against all self-insured employers as provided in Subsection
(14).
(d) The results of the examination ordered under Subsection (15)(b)
shall be kept confidential.
(16) In any claim against an employer by the Uninsured Employers'
Fund, or by or on behalf of the employee to whom or to whose dependents
compensation and other benefits are paid or payable from the Uninsured
Employers' Fund, the burden of proof is on the employer or other party in
Addendum page 52

interest objecting to the claim. The claim is presumed to be valid up to the full
amount 01 workers' compensation benefits claimed by the employee or the
employee's dependents. This Subsection (16) applies whether the claim is filed
in court or in an adjudicative proceeding under the authority of the
commission.
(17) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship
may not recover compensation or other benefits from the Uninsured
Employers' Fund if:
(a) the person is not included as an employee under Subsection 34A2-104(3); or (b) the person is included as an employee under Subsection 34A2-104(3), but:
" *
(i) the person's employer fails to insure or otherwise provide adequate
payment of direct compensation; and
(ii) the failure described in Subsection (17)(b)(i) is attributable to an
act or omission over which the person had or shared control or responsibility.
(18) A director or officer of a corporation may not recover
compensation or other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund if the
director or officer is excluded from coverage under Subsection 34A-2-104(4).
(19) The Uninsured Employers' Fund:
(a) shall be:
(i) used in accordance with this section only for:
(A) the purpose of assisting in the payment of workers' compensation
benefits in accordance with Subsection (1); and
(B) in accordance with Subsection (3), payment of:
(I) reasonable costs of administering the Uninsured Employers' Fund;
or
(II) fees required to be paid by the Uninsured Employers' Fund; and
(ii) expended according to processes that can be verified by audit;
and
(b) may not be used for:
(i) administrative costs unrelated to the Uninsured Employers' Fund;
or
(ii) any activity of the commission other than an activity described in
Subsection (19)(a).
(20) (a) For purposes of Subsection (1), an employment relationship is
localized in the state if:
(i) (A) the employer who is liable for the benefits has a business
premise in the state; and
(B) (I) the contract for hire is entered into in the state; or
(II) the employee regularly performs work duties in the state for the
employer who is liable for the benefits; or
(ii) the employee is:
(A) a resident of the state; and
(B) regularly performs work duties in the state for the employer who
is liable for the benefits.
(b) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act, the commission shall by rule define what constitutes
regularly performing work duties in the state.
Amended by Chapter 183, 2000 General Session
63-46b-16
Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of
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Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by
the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for
judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that:
- >
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten,
summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten,
summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been
substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency
action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any
statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decisionmaking process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as
a decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light oi the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(ill) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies
the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and
rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session
78-27a-l
Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the
"Small Business Equal Access to Justice Act."
Enacted by Chapter 298, 1983 General Session
78-27a-3 Definitions. As used in this act:
(1) "Prevail" means to obtain favorable final judgment, the right to all
appeals having been exhausted, on the merits, on substantially all counts or
charges in the action and with respect to the most significant issue or set of
issues presented, but does not include the settlement of any action, either by
stipulation, consent decree or otherwise, whether or not settlement occurs
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before or after any hearing or trial.
(2) "Reasonable litigation expenses" means court costs,
administrative hearing costs, attorney's fees, and witness fees of all necessary
witnesses, not in excess of $10,000, which a court finds were reasonably
incurred in opposing action covered under this act.
(3) "Small business" means a commercial or business entity, including
a sole proprietorship, which does not have more than 250 employees, but
does not include an entity which is a subsidiary or affiliate of another entity
which is not a small business.
(4) "State" means any department, board, institution, hospital, college,
or university of the state of Utah or any political subdivision thereof, except
with respect to antitrust actions brought under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 9.
Enacted by Chapter 298, 1983 General Session
78-27a-5
Litigation expense award authorized in appeals from
administrative decisions.
(1) In any civil judicial appeal taken from an administrative decision
regarding a matter in which the administrative action was commenced by the
state, and which involves the business regulatory functions of the state, a
court may award reasonable litigation expenses to any small business which is
a named party if the small business prevails in the appeal and the court finds
that the state action was undertaken without substantial justification.
(2) Arty state agency or political subdivision may require by rule or
ordinance that a small business exhaust administrative remedies prior to
making a claim under this act.
Enacted by Chapter 298, 1983 General Session
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; representations to
court; sanctions.
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name,
or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party.
Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any.
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings
need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be
stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being
called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written
motion, or other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or
later advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the
best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support
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after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to
respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court
may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction
upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or
are responsible for the violation.
(1) How initiated.
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in
Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21
days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or
aenial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court
may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and
attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate
circumstances, a law firm may fe held jointly responsible for violations
committed by its partners, memtiers, and employees.
(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an
order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision
(b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it
has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation
of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such
conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the
limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or
include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into
court, or, if imposed on motion ana warranted for effective deterrence, an
order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable
attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented
party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative
unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or
settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose
attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the
conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis
for the sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this
rule do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections,
and motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
Code of Judicial Administration
Rule 4-505. Attorney fees affidavits.
Intent: To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for
affidavits in support of attorney fees.
Applicability: This rule shall govern the award of attorney fees in the
trial courts.
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Statement of the Rule:
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed
with the court and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the
nature of the work performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to
prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matter to
the stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of
the fees for comparable legal services.
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other
than attorneys, for time spent, work completed and hourly rate billed.
(3) If the affidavit is in support of attorney fees for services rendered
to a person or entity who has been assigned an interest in a claim for the
purpose of collection or hired by the obligee to collect a debt, the affidavit
shall also state that the attorney is not sharing the fee or any portion thereof
in violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 5A
(4) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it
is expected will require considerable additional work to collect, the following
phrase may be included in the judgment after an award consistent with the
time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees incurred
in pursuit of collection:
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL
BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT BY
EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY
AFFIDAVIT."
(5) Attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to this rule or pursuant to
Rule 4-505.1.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted'
by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gam time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon
its own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the
appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause
why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set
forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least
ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause
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shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded,
the court shall grant a hearing.
Rule 34. Award of costs.
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an
appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise
agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is
affirmed, costs shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a
judgment or order isreversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless
otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is
vacated, costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be
allowed or taxed in a criminal case.
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases involving the
state of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an award of costs for or against
the state shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or
prohibited by law.
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds and other expenses
on appeal. The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing
party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or
memoranda and attachments not to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs
incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record, including costs of
the reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid
for supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the fees
for filing and docketing the appeal.
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. A party claiming costs shall,
within 15 days after the remittitur is filed with the clerk of the trial court, serve
upon the adverse party and file with the clerk of the trial court an itemized
and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days of service of
the bill of costs, serve and file a notice of objection, together with a motion to
have the costs taxed by the trial court. If there is no objection to the cost bill
within the allotted time, the clerk of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed
and enter judgment for the party entitled thereto, which judgment shall be
entered in the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in the case
of other judgments of record. If the cost bill of the prevailing party is timely
opposed, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax the costs
and enter a final determination and judgment which shall thereupon be
entered in the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in tne case
of other judgments of record. The determination of the clerk shall be
reviewable by the trial court upon the request of either party made within 5
days of the entry of the judgment.
(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency appeals. In all other
matters before the court, including appeals from an agency,costs may be
allowed as in cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days after the
expiration of the time in which a petition for rehearing may be filed or within
13 days after an order denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have
been awarded may file with the clerk of the appellate court and serve upon
the adverse party an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may,
within 5 days after the service of the bill of costs file a notice of objection and
a motion to have the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is
filed within the allotted time, the clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter
judgment against the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to the
Addendum page 58

cost bill, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and
settle the costs, tax the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against
the adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by the
court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of
judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument shall not be permitted. A
judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in
the state, who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manner and
with the same force and effect as judgments of the district court.
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